Irish Slavonic Studies

24

Irish Association for Russian, Central and East European Studies

Cumann Slaiviseach na hEireann

2012

ISBN 1-905952-39-2; 978-1-905952-39-7

Edited by Neil Robinson and Conny Opitz

Copies of previous editions of *Irish Slavonic Studies* can be ordered from http://www.iarcees.org/publications.php.

IARCEES, Russian and Slavonic Studies, Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland

Contents

Contributors

Ekaterina Bagreeva is an Assistant Professor at the Plekhanov University of Economics (Moscow/Russia), Department of Economic Security and Criminal Law. She lectures on juridical psychology, cross-cultural communication, and cultural adaptation. She is also working in Norway as a lecturer and consultant. She publishes on Russian and Norwegian auto- and hetero-stereotypes and the life quality among the Russian-speaking migrants in Europe. Her scholarly interests are the Russian-speaking diaspora in Europe, migrants' adaptation strategies, and the trilemmatic approach to human behavior.

Darima Batorova is a PhD student in the Institute of International Relations at Charles University. She currently serves as Assistant Dean at Anglo American University in Prague (School of international Relations and Diplomacy).

Galina Denisova is Head of the department of social communications and technologies at the Pedagogical Institute of South Federal University (Rostov on Don, Russia). She lectures on institutional theory in sociology, migration processes in Southern Russia, the sociology of law. She publishes on ethnicity and adaptation of migrants, migration and identification, Russians in the North Caucasus, migration and identity in south Russia. Her scholarly interests are ethno-sociological and ethno-political processes in south Russia, identity, migration, adaptation, integration, multiculturalism.

Dmitry V. Efremenko, PhD, is Head of Sociology Department, Institute for Scientific Information on Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Viktor Kuvaldin is Executive Director of the 'Expertise' Round Table (the Gorbachev Foundation), Doctor of History, Professor at MGIMO University (the Moscow State Institute of International Relations) and the Lomonosov Moscow State University. At the start of *perestroika* he was Adviser with the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and in 1991, Adviser to the Aide to the President of the USSR.

German Mendzheritskiy is a scientific researcher at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts (Dortmund/Germany), Faculty of Applied Social Sciences, Project EMIGMA. He publishes on the problems of Russian-speaking migrant communities in Germany and Europe, migration, intercultural interaction. His scholarly interests are the Russian-speaking diaspora in Germany and in Europe, processes of migration, adaptation and integration, environmental protection and migration.

Mikhail A. Molchanov is Associate Professor of Political Science at St. Thomas University, Fredericton, NB, Canada. He is the author of *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations* (Texas A & M University Press, 2002), as well as co-author and co-editor of *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives* (Greenwood/Praeger, 2002) and *The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership* (Ashgate, 2009).

Natalia Pushkareva is a widely published scholar who was a Leading Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998), Head of Women's and Gender Studies Department (2008), Chief Editor of the yearbook *Sotsialnaya istoriya* (Social History) (from 2007) and President of 'Russian Association for Research in Women's History' (2002). She is a Professor and Head of Women & Gender Studies Department, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Three Forks in the Road of Gorbachev's *Perestroika*

Viktor Kuvaldin

For a human being, 20 years is an entire life span. This is a period separating one generation from another. For history, 20 years is just a moment. To make a comprehensive analysis of a major phenomenon like Gorbachev's *perestroika* a distance of 20 years is not big at all. Many participants in the events are still alive; political and human passions have not yet died down; and by no means all secret things have been made manifest.

I would like to start with what seems like a formal question as to the time given by history to carry out *perestroika*. The answer seams obvious: a little over seven years. But was it really so? There are many reasons to believe that the process called '*perestroika*' was in fact much shorter than the time of Mikhail Gorbachev's period in power. According to authoritative estimates, the beginning of *perestroika* proper can be associated with the preparation and holding of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The preceding year and a half should be seen as a 'pre-*Perestroika*' period, described below. Likewise, the dramatic finale of *perestroika* came not in December and not even in August 1991. The borderline beyond which it would difficult to state that *perestroika* processes were been continued was essentially the election of Boris Yeltsin as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and adoption of the Declaration on Sovereignty in the first half of June 1990 by the Russian Parliament. After that a 'dual center' emerged in the USSR and was soon transformed into a situation of 'dual power'. In Russia, like anywhere else, dual power means a fierce struggle for power until one of the parties is fully victorious. In this situation, it is meaningless to refer to a more or less normal continuation of *perestroika*. It turns out that *perestroika*, in the precise meaning of the word, lasted about three and a half years.[1] This time would not be enough to make a radical turn in the life of any country. Three and a half years is an extremely short period to carry out a profound transformation of such a complicated and fragile organism as the Soviet Union. Such a short period increases the risk of mistakes and miscalculations many times.

Many things in the assessment of *perestroika* depend on what precisely is meant by *perestroika*. Its initiators conceived *perestroika* as a renewal of socialism to render it more democratic and humane. We understand it as a Soviet (Russian) search for ways out of the totalitarian system that called itself 'real socialism'. This movement out of the labyrinths and dead-ends of 'state socialism' meant a lot of things: from restoration of market economy to the establishment of pluralism of ideas. However, the essence of its meaning was transition from party and police dictatorship to modern representative institutions based on the rule of law. The entire frame of reference of the public life was

[1] See, for example, Barsenkov A.S. *Vvedeniye v sovremennuyu rossiiskuyu istoriyu (Introduction to Modern Russian History)*. M., 2002, pp. 43, 81, and 172.

changed in just a few years. From the point of view of mass psychology, consciousness and behavior, *perestroika* meant three grandiose transitions, namely 1) transition from strict state regulation of distribution of goods and services, guaranteeing everyone a certain subsistence minimum, to commodity-money relations, accompanied by a rapid social stratification of the rather homogeneous Soviet society; 2) transition from formal, purely superficial participation in political life to a conscious choice and real opportunity to influence the government; and 3) transition from conformism of ideas, imposed from the top, to true axiological and ideological self-determination of individuals. *Perestroika* resulted in the abrupt relocation of the 'Soviet man' from one social world into a different one, previously known to him solely from magazines and movies, and often in a distorted way at that. Looking back, one might say that the key to understanding the fate of *perestroika* is the correlation between economic, political, and ideological reforms and their interdependence and reciprocal influence. A simplified and distorted formulation of this 'question of questions' is often seen in arguments regarding the extent to which *perestroika* could and should have followed the path of Chinese reforms. It is obvious that such an approach is open to criticism, since the realities inherited by reformers of the two socialist giants were different. However, it still reflects the essence of the matter: the tragic finale of *perestroika* was in many ways predetermined by the impossibility, the inability or reluctance to break down the overwhelming 'super-task' into separate program blocks, to prioritize them, avoid 'getting ahead of developments,' and refrain from trying to resolve all problems at once. Retrospectively, the actual succession of actions taken by Gorbachev's leadership team looks as follows: revolution in consciousness – political reform – economic reforms. There was logic to it because the established etatist administrative and command system looked like an integral rigid body that rejected any attempt at partial reforms. However, the overload created by the simultaneous launch of offensives on all fronts gave rise to risk, the degree of which went beyond acceptable limits. Add the outburst of national conflicts in the polyethnic, polyconfessional, and polycivilizational environment; the rapidly emerging conservative and radical opposition ready to go any length to seize power; the lightning collapse of the protective cover of the 'European socialist system'; and formidable external forces striving to 'do away with the Soviet empire' and it looks like Gorbachev's leadership team had few chances to survive and carry through the great cause it undertook.

Moving out of the etatist system, even in the relatively homogeneous Soviet society, could only be made through a fierce struggle between various ideological and political projects. All kinds of forces, including the external ones, actively participated in this struggle. It goes without saying that their chances of success were determined by the availability of appropriate resources and capabilities. Here the various components of the elite of the late Soviet period played first fiddle: the party and state *nomenklatura,* economic leaders, prominent members of the intelligentsia, public and political figures of the 'new wave,' shadow dealers, and even top leaders of the criminal world. Each of the segments of the Soviet 'top leadership' sought to direct the rapidly developing transformations of the stagnated society into a channel benefiting them; everybody hurried to stake positions for the future, and many were busy pushing forward their own public projects. They also had a minimal common denominator: conversion of the Soviet-time status into power and property in the post-socialist social medium.

Assuming that *perestroika*, as a more or less meaningful movement towards a new system, began much later than March-April 1985, we may ask ourselves the question, 'What was done during the first eighteen months of Gorbachev's stay in power?' This 'pre-*perestroika*' period (spring 1985-autumn 1986) was a desperate attempt to breathe new life into the decrepit Soviet system. Strictly speaking, 'pre-*perestroika*' began not with Mikhail Gorbachev, but Yuri Andropov, his predecessor and patron, who regarded Mikhail Gorbachev as his successor and continuer of his work, becoming General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (in November 1982). It was exactly at that time that '... the ruling elite started to show desire to significantly upgrade the existing social and economic system. However, the balance of forces 'at the top' and their ideological attachment to a certain system of values imposed rather rigid limits on possible changes'.[2]

In the first eighteen months, Gorbachev's leadership team was only approaching the fork in the road, busy mostly with implementation of the program of their predecessor. Andropov's guidelines and his ideological and political legacy largely set the logic of actions in 1985-1986. The key reference points were the system's stability and 'realization of the creative potential of socialism,' which eventually found its expression in the slogan of 'acceleration of social and economic development.' Thus, what was done was the technocratic adjustment of the existing mechanism that had come loose in the situation of 'stagnating and progressing' paralysis of power,[3] rather than an economic reform. Undoubtedly, it would have been much better if Andropov himself implemented his own program, inherited by Gorbachev. In this case, he could have demythologized the 'untapped reserves of socialism' and, perhaps, passed on to his successor more practical experience of reforming and less illusions. However, he was not destined to fully launch his plans, and the task of resuscitating the 'state socialism,' as well as its dismantling, fell to the lot of Gorbachev's team.

An obviously conflicting mixture of historical tasks was sure to make the path of *perestroika* take the form of a zigzag. At the start of Gorbachev's reforms the most significant in scale and importance was the so-called 'anti-drinking' campaign (May 1985). Much has been said about it, mostly unflattering. Such opinions seem not quite fair, but the scope of this article does not allow us to debate this subject. For us, in this particular context, the anti-drinking campaign is important as a harbinger of hardships to fall to the lot of Gorbachev's plan. The interpretation of this story offered by Mikhail Gorbachev himself has an obvious 'gap' between the depth and the scale of the problem and the approaches to its resolution.[4] The campaign was launched as a storming attempt with doubtful chances of success, where long-term consistent efforts were needed. In trying to explain and justify the stepped-up pace of campaign against the demon drink, he writes, 'It was because our desire to solve this big trouble was so great'.[5] The same style is characteristic of another failed experiment in the field of economy, the so-called *gospriyomka*, or state commissioning system, where a system to control production quality at military plants was spread to civil enterprises. He offers a similar explanation of the

[2] Ibid, p. 49.
[3] Ibid, pp. 58-63.
[4] Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy (Life and Reforms),* Book One. Moscow, 1995, pp. 338-342.
[5] Ibid, p. 342.

insufficiently thought-out measures: 'We wanted to upgrade production quality as soon as possible and using every means ... since time urged us on.'[6]

The anti-drinking campaign was a baptism of fire for the reformers, testifying to their acute, even hypertrophied, *sense of time in history.* And it is not at all surprising: they were making desperate efforts to make up for lost time (the policy of 'acceleration') after the stagnation of Brezhnev's time. They constantly felt the pressure of time constraints (a little overplayed one, though, as seen from the subsequent events) and that the time for accomplishing everything that was planned had already run out. They were spurred by the desire to make the reforms irreversible and not let the conservatives undo what had been achieved. What made them speed-up things was the strict logic of the bipolar confrontation with the United States and the capitalist world. And, finally, there was that eternal sin of the Russian intelligentsia, *impatience,* which often makes one race against time. In retrospect, the failure of the anti-drinking campaign sounded a strong warning to alert the reformers that the explainable and understandable desire to move mountains in the shortest time possible was counterproductive. However, to heed it and draw the right conclusions in the fever of *perestroika* routine was not at all that easy.

Having swiftly passed the 'Andropov stage,' in the middle of 1986, the reformers reached a fork in the road to the increasingly hazy future. As testified by a Russian researcher of that period, by the middle or the second half of 1986, two approaches took shape at the 'top' towards further reforms of Soviet society, namely, the 'economic and technological' approach and the 'political' one. The former envisaged implementation of economic reforms, while keeping the political system intact, whereas the latter approach provided for rapid and determined democratization of society. Aiming at a political reform, the democratically minded Party leaders had a quite clear idea of the scope of conceived changes and things they sought to accomplish.[7] Despite the obvious risks of speeding-up the reform of the political system, particularly in the context of growing economic problems and difficulties, they opted for the latter approach.[8] Simultaneously, intensive reinvention of such key notions of Gorbachev's reforms as '*perestroika*' and *glasnost'* is taking place. Sensing the growing opposition to his course, the General Secretary is increasingly emphasizing the revolutionary nature of the developments taking place. Once started as a simple change in the style of work, '*Perestroika*' now is a symbol of breaking away from the totalitarian past and of profound democratization of society. Likewise, *glasnost*,' conceived as a feedback channel between the 'top' and 'the grass roots' is becoming an important lever of democratization and a unique means of making the masses more socially and politically active.

Having mentally crossed the borderline of 1986 and 1987 separating Andropov's 'pre-*perestroika*' and Gorbachev's '*perestroika*',[9] let us look back and once again ask ourselves the 'accursed question,' 'How justified was this spurt forward on all fronts in the context of the deteriorating social and economic situation?' Did a more down-to-

---

[6] Ibid, p. 343.

[7] Medvedev V. *V komande Gorbacheva (In the Team of Gorbachev).* Moscow, 1994, pp.44-45; Shakhnazarov G. *S vozhdyami i bez (With and Without Leaders).* Moscow, 2001, p.325.

[8] Barsenkov, op.cit, pp.74-78.

[9] Gorbachev himself sees the borderline of 1986-1987 as 'the first serious crisis of *perestroika*' (Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy,* Book One, p.311).

earth strategy of consistent economic reforms in the spirit of 'market socialism,' which yielded good fruits in the former European countries of 'people's democracy,' in China and in Vietnam, promise more chances of success? There are many serious arguments in favor of the choice made by Gorbachev's team on the threshold of the year 1987. The system of 'state socialism,' which took shape over seven decades (spanning three generations!) and consolidated itself, rejected economic innovations; everybody remembered the examples of unsuccessful undertakings in this field, in particular, Kosygin's reform. Not only the economic reforms, but also the reformers themselves, could be buried by the 'back wave.' Everybody remembered the story of Khrushchev all too well.[10] The 'economic bias' of *perestroika* could seem too insipid and dull to its mass support base that was taking shape: the renewal-minded part of the Party-state elite, the intelligentsia, and the youth.

Still one other thing can be added to these weighty considerations, one that played a very important role, although was hidden from view: the 'world outlook' that existed in the minds of the people who were ideologically preparing and inspiring *Perestroika*. The West and, above all, the United States was dominating it as a reference point and a role model. The Western experience of social development, centered on a free individual, pushed everything else into the background. I am referring specifically to the phenomenon of rather successful efforts at authoritarian modernization taken in the East, in countries like South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan. These were not on the radar of the then most dominant and influential figures in the Soviet system. However, typologically this phenomenon was as significant for Soviet society as the tempting Western models.

There is still another thing. The authoritarian modernization, the rails of which Gorbachev's *perestroika* resolutely left in the end of 1986, needed its own political agent. It could be the state apparatus, the armed forces, or the Party. In any event, what was needed was a significant part of the national elite willing to take the risk of profound social and economic reforms. Did the elite of the later Soviet period contain such a segment? Stubborn battles over the first attempts at economic reform, which took place in 1987, can be viewed as a kind of real-life test of the reform potential of the *nomenklatura* of the late Soviet period. Looking back, Gorbachev himself calls the transformation of planned economy into a market economy '... an immensely challenging task.'[11] Of course, the first steps on that path were the most difficult ones. Stereotypes of 'socialist mentality,' combined with the huge interests that were affected by the fundamental changes of power relationships in the state-run economy, were capable of nipping any reform in the bud. Particularly fierce was the resistance of the 'general staffs' of the economic bureaucracy, like the Gosplan (State Planning Committee), the Gossnab (State Procurement Committee), the Finance Ministry, the Government Office, and the ministries, relying on the corps of directors, or executives of enterprises. Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov, whose relations with Gorbachev began to show the first signs of a rift, often

[10] Andrey Grachev directly points out to running away from '... the ever-present haunting ghost of Khrushchev-style 'dismissal' that could take place at every next Plenum of the Central Committee.' Grachev A. *Gorbachev,* Moscow, 2001, p. 236.

[11] Gorbachev M.S. *Razmyshleniya o proshlom i budushchem (Reflections on the Past and the Future),* Moscow, 1998, p.69.

played the role of their mouthpiece. The stubborn tug-of-war between the camps of reformers and conservatives resulted in a reasonable compromise. If measured by the standards of that time, the decisions that were been taken were radical, even revolutionary, and, a true break-through. They were paving the way for shifting the economy onto market rails.

However, this was just paving the way, no more than that. The economic reform of 1987 yielded limited and controversial results. There were many reasons for this, like Soviet society's lack of entrepreneurial zest, persistent sabotage by the powerful economic bureaucracy of decisions that were taken, reformers' inconsistency, in particular, in the pricing policy, and the inevitable mistakes and miscalculations made in new and complex activity. As a result, valuable time was lost and the most propitious moment to start a painful adaptation of the population to new conditions of economic life was missed; the uncontrolled increase in money supply and the growing shortages of goods were destroying the consumer market. Subsequently, this 'miscalculation of a strategic nature' would have a most adverse impact on the fate of *perestroika.*[12]

What conclusions can be drawn from this sad story? The first and the most important one is that the objective correlation of forces in society at the start of the 'Gorbachev stage' of *perestroika* allowed the implementation of profound economic reforms without affecting the political sphere. The second conclusion is that the concentration of forces on the economic front was not only possible, but also necessary. Looking back now, Vadim Medvedev, one of Gorbachev' closest associates and an architect of the reforms, writes, '... the time allotted us to carry out a radical economic reform was much less than the cited three to four years. We had to take extraordinary measures and resolutely shift to market relations.'[13] The third conclusion is as follows: the profound economic reforms could have been used as a test of efficiency of the political system of Soviet society and helped chart promising courses of its transformation. The fourth one reads: they had to be started, *as far as possible,* before the political reform so as not to create an explosive mixture of mass discontent and organized protest that could be easily used by the anti-Gorbachev opposition both from the left and from the right. And, finally, the fifth conclusion is that the new economic agents engendered by the reform sooner or later start to demand political representation of their interests. From that time on, they were factors of not only the economic process, but of the political one as well. And, of course, they would not be adherents of 'socialist choice.' It looks like Gorbachev himself was not sure whether the route he had chosen was right. Later he stated, 'The economic reforms have fallen behind the political ones.'[14]

What tipped the scales back then in choosing the path to take? Andrey Grachev offered a very interesting explanation in this regard: 'Obviously, one should view the fact that economic aspects of the reform always proved to be subordinate to the political ones and meant to serve them as the main reason for that choice.'[15] In the seemingly immortal but vulnerable Soviet system, the economy was tightly wrapped into politics and everything was covered with a thick ideological fog. In protecting itself, the System

[12] Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy,* Book One, p.363.
[13] Medvedev, *op.cit.*, p. 54.
[14] Cited in Grachev, *op.cit.*, p.247
[15] Ibid. See also p. 218.

imposed a logic of action on the reformers attempting to alter its foundations. Nevertheless, the question still stands, 'To what extent was Gorbachev's leadership team forced to accept the pattern of behavior imposed on it by the 'given circumstances'?

Time wise, the second fork in the road of Gorbachev's *perestroika* is close to the first one. And it is not accidental. Having exhausted the potential of '*perestroika* Andropov-style,' Gorbachev was groping for a way to the future. He became increasingly convinced that the point of reform was replacement of the 'System', rather than its overhaul, even if a major one. Plans for profound reforms in various spheres were been conceived almost simultaneously – clashing and competing with each other – since everything had to be changed, from the roof to the foundation. The political reform given priority over economic changes could be interpreted and implemented in different ways. The January 1987 Plenum opted for a radical version, aimed at speeded-up democratization of society. Remaining in the shadow were other transformation models of the late Soviet polity, rejected without any serious discussion.

Political reform was the core of Gorbachev's reforms, since the party-state was the essence of the Soviet system. The operation conceived by the General Secretary to separate them and turn into a normal modern party (or parties) and a state required an accurate calculation and extremely high precision to perform it. Otherwise, both of them could prove to be feeble and anemic creations unable to stand the overloads of *perestroika*. This ultimately proved to be the case. However, could it be that this entire plan was doomed to failure from the very start, with absolutely no chances for this peculiar product of the Stalin era to survive?

In the light of the events that actually happened, the temptation is strong to give an affirmative answer. However, let us not jump to a final verdict. In the party-state link, the CPSU was the 'leading and guiding' element. Its ability to self-reform and find its place in post-Soviet society remains the subject of heated discussions even today. Roughly speaking, in the Communist Party of the mid-1980s, comprised almost 20 million members. It is possible to distinguish three main components within it, namely, 1) the party apparatus; 2) the notorious *nomenklatura;* and 3) the mass of its members. Each of them deserves a special discussion in the context of p*erestroika.*

To estimate the reform potential of the party masses would be the easiest thing. Of course, the CPSU had much dead wood. It granted membership to fill quotas on the instructions from the top to ensure the right social composition of the 'party of workers and peasants.' At the same time, all socially active elements of Soviet society sought to join the party and wormed their way into it by fair means or foul. In this sense, it was indeed a 'vanguard,' which left the forces opposing the system in a desolate wilderness, with few human resources at all. Although it is true that ordinary members of the party, its modest toilers entitled to no benefits, were not very much attached to the old order of things many Communists welcomed *perestroika* as a long-awaited renewal. The party mass of many millions pushed *perestroika* forward and not backward. It is much more difficult to figure out what the *nomenklatura* felt about the revolutionary reforms started by Gorbachev. With its privileged positions in Soviet society, it instinctively feared any changes. Its life, judging by the standards of the 'socialist camp,' was not bad at all and it did have something to lose. It was aware that the Soviet system had started to decay; however, it hoped that things would settle somehow or, if the worst came to the worst, the system would last in their lifetimes.

What was of decisive importance for the fate of *prestroika* was the stand of the top leadership, the 'bosses,' rather than of the whole *nomenklatura* layer, numbering a few million people. It grew more and more negative as the changes became more profound. Nevertheless, it is still unclear how predetermined its evolution was in this aspect. Probably, it would be more correct to formulate this problem in a different way: was Gorbachev able to win over to his side the decisive groups of the Soviet elite, without making excessive concessions and departures from the set goal? Were they ready to proceed still further on the *perestroika* path after having passed the 'Andropov stage'? Today hardly anyone can answer this question with certainty. However, it is possible to offer some reflections.

While maintaining continuity, Gorbachev's generation of leaders greatly differs from its predecessors of Brezhnev's and Andropov's times. It was better educated, less narrow-minded and had a more adequate perception of the outside world. It was *the second post- Stalin generation* at the helm of the huge superpower, which left a deep imprint on their inner world and social and political views. Their predecessors represented by the Khrushchev and Brezhnev cohort shaped by the October era were, at heart, *the last soldiers of the world revolution.* Unlike the 'children of October', Gorbachev and his supporters, as a product of de-Stalinization, were more independently minded. Their feeling of the fundamental ambiguity of their personal and group status was rather acute. On the one hand, they were people vested with great powers and wielding enormous resources; on the other hand, they were just public officials of high ranks, whose status in society was fully determined by their post and place in the hierarchy. Without their offices, they were nobody and had nothing to leave their children. Looking carefully at the world around them, they saw that beyond the boundaries of the 'socialist camp' people of their caliber were always valued, irrespective of their official status. Getting ahead of myself, I can say that the overwhelming ambiguity about the status of members of the Soviet elite predetermined its rather cynical and indifferent parting with the System. It goes without saying that to feel sympathetic towards *perestroika* it had to see a proper place for itself in the new order of things. It was feasible, since it absorbed almost all dynamic elements of Soviet society, which had no counter-elite. Indeed, even in the years of *perestroika*, many members of the Soviet elite managed to quite successfully convert their positions in the power system into property rights. With their new status in hand, they quickly outflanked *perestroika* and pushed it far beyond the boundaries of the 'socialist choice path.' According to a Russian researcher of that period, '... amidst the Party, Soviet and economic *nomenklatura* a movement was taking shape … which was interested in having their new status legitimized and, consequently, [was for] the radicalization of the reforms.'[16] It was not by chance that in the post-Soviet Russia, many former members of the 'old *nomenklatura'* managed to maintain and consolidate their social status. Gorbachev knew this kind of people, with their flexibility and timeserving spirit, well enough. He had no illusions about them. However, he never attached great importance to them either. Possibly, that is why he only brushed aside persistent advice that he 'sort them out.' However, it went against his grain; besides, he did not see any urgent necessity to do it. Apparently, his intuition told him that they would not fight for the 'bright ideals of communism' and would get on well with anybody.

[16] Barsenkov, *op.cit.*, p. 121. See also p. 122.

Finally, there was the *Party apparatus*. It was huge and rather influential, the core of the system in the party state and the living embodiment of its spirit.[17] It was the Party apparatus that considered itself the Party, and it had every reason to think so. Gorbachev also professed the principle of 'cadres decide everything' and paid unflagging attention to the Party apparatus. He quickly came to the conclusion that the root of evil lied there and tried to restrict the absolute rule of the Party bosses. The General Secretary tried to keep them on a short leash to avoid repeating the sad fate of Khrushchev. Ignoring the persistent advice given by his closest associates, Gorbachev would not let go of the reins of the 'vanguard of the Soviet people' right to the end. Despite all the costs of such a close association and involuntary identification with his 'sworn friends,' Gorbachev explained to a small group of his confidants that he saw no other option; the hardened apparatchiks were capable of making a fine mess of things if left to their own devices.[18] Later, another important consideration appeared, namely, the fear that 'federalization of the party' would become a prelude to destruction of the union state.[19] Such fears were more than justified as subsequent events show. A biographer of Gorbachev states that ' ... as long as the party clamp existed it prevented the state from disintegration.'[20] There was still another one and, possibly, the most decisive motive. In Gorbachev's memoirs a constant hope is discernible that reforming the CPSU and turning it into a modern political force and a powerful instrument of democratic renewal of Soviet society was possible.[21] At the same time, according to some opinions, he did not pay enough attention to reforming the party and renewing its leadership, particularly, in its higher echelon.[22] As *perestroika* grew deeper and more radical, the ways of Gorbachev and the most influential layer of the Party bosses parted more and more. One of the most important motives of the political reform conceived by Gorbachev was getting free from the suffocating embrace of his 'party fellows.' To a significant extent he succeeded; however, he paid a high price for that. The Party apparatus became the center of resistance to the reform-minded leadership of the country, with Yegor Ligachev, its unofficial leader and symbol of conservatism. In fact, Gorbachev's opponents in the Politburo and the Secretariat, the Party Areopagus, outnumbered the architects of

[17] The staff of the CPSU Central Committee alone amounted to approximately 3,000 people, while the army of Party apparatchiks totaled hundreds of times this figure. In the first major staff reduction in the party apparatus in autumn 1988 the dismissal of 800 to 900 thousand people was considered.

[18] See Chernyayev, A.S. *Shest let s Gorbachevym (My Six Years with Gorbachev).* Moscow, 1993,., pp. 242, 356; Shakhnazarov,, *With and Without Leaders,* pp. 425, 428. See also Gorbachev,. *Zhizn i reformy ,* Book Two, p. 540.

[19] Op.cit, p. 538.

[20] Grachev, *op.cit.*, p. 254.

[21] Gorbachev M.S. *Zhizn i reformy* . Book Two, pp. 524, 542, and 548.

[22] See: Shakhnazarov, *With and Without Leaders,* p. 410. A different viewpoint also exists, according to which the reason was 'not the people, but the functions they perform.' However, Andrey Grachev, who offered it, also stated '...Gorbachev has not in effect done anything to help the 'second party,' the party of *Perestroika* (i.e. ordinary Communists supporting *Perestroika — V.K.)* to organize into a formal entity.' Grachev, *op.cit.*, pp. 228, 229.

perestroika. On the eve of the historic 19th Party Conference in June 1988, a well-informed aide to the General Secretary offered a sober assessment of the actual level of support showed to his boss by his closest associates; he described the 'mighty handful' of Gorbachev's supporters as '... two or three members of the Politburo and two or three Secretaries of the Central Committee.'[23] Later, the party leader increasingly became an 'alien among his own people' as relationships were strained to the utmost.

To what extent was the destructive conflict between the mighty apparatus and the no less mighty General Secretary preprogrammed? Did Mikhail Gorbachev have any chance to tame this bearer of Soviet traditions? Of course, there are no ifs and buts in history, but it is always useful to reflect on alternative scenarios. We can start with the question of the *real extent of resistance* by the party apparatus to Gorbachev's reforms. Nailed to the pillory by the *perestroika*-period cliché of 'braking mechanisms' it never dared to openly break with its nominal leader. Both the difficult 19th Party Conference and even the more difficult (and last) 28th Party Congress, ended with an undisputable victory of Gorbachev over the party conservatives, who were forced to grin and bear his leadership. The August coup (of 1991) was plotted by the top bosses of the state apparatus and not by party leaders, who took a wait-and-see approach. It turns out that the threat from the right wing, the orthodox communists, was not as great as it seemed in the years of *perestroika* (eventually, the fatal blow was dealt by the coalition of anti-communist minded radicals and nationalists). We can find an important proof of this in Gorbachev's works. Speaking about the stubborn resistance continuously shown to his reform efforts, he wrote, 'Standing in opposition were only *the most hardcore members of the apparatus'* (emphasis added).[24]

The internal Party opposition that gradually took shape had its own inherent flaws that prevented it from recapturing the initiative. First, it was not strong enough. Even at the 28th Party Congress, where conservative opposition reached its apogee, they could expect, with more or less certainty, to get only a third of the vote.[25] Second, there was a lack of fresh ideas. The Soviet people were fed up with the 'real socialism.' 'Socialism with a human face' was a prerogative of Gorbachev's reformers. Nobody wanted a return to Stalinism, least of all the reformers themselves. An ideational vacuum emerged revealing an insatiable thirst for power but nothing else. Third, generally speaking, the right had no leader. Ligachev was a professional in apparatus games and intrigues; in the new era of public politics he was no match for either Gorbachev or Yeltsin. If one adds to the above the sacral character of the General Secretary's figure and the sizeable support showed to the reformer by an awakened society one comes to the conclusion that the conservatives' chances of success were less than they seemed at the time.

In all probability the 'danger from the right-wing' was somewhat overplayed (and the danger from the left-wing, namely, from the radical 'democrats,' was underestimated). In terms of survival of the leaders of the reforms – and in the fifth year of *perestroika* the issue started to be formulated in exactly this way – the political reforms gave results as controversial as the results yielded by economic reforms. State power was taken by the

[23] Chernyayev., *op.cit*., p. 217. See also Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy ,* Book One, p. 387.
[24] Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy ,* Book One, p. 347.
[25] Shakhnazarov, *With and Without Leaders,* p. 429.

Soviets, at least nominally. According to Georgy Shakhnazarov, a 'super-democratic monster,' a two-tier parliament unknown to the world, started to reign at the top of the new power pyramid. Expelled from Olympus, the CPSU was offered a status of a 'normal parliamentary party.' Undoubtedly, at first, the political reforms strengthened the positions of *perestroika* leadership. Gorbachev, as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (after 1 October 1988), got a new foothold that widened his room for maneuver. Sessions of the Congress of People's Deputies, which immediately became the most popular TV series, speeded up the process of political enlightenment and education of the masses immensely. At the end of the communist regime, some semblance of modern representative institutions appeared, and the revival of the Russian parliamentary system started. A deadly blow was delivered to the command and administrative system from which it never recovered.

However, the proposed structure showed serious flaws shortly after that. The party was debarred from administrative control levers; bodies of power, with their pivot taken away, lost their efficiency; and the vessel of the state lost stability. Soon the processes triggered by political reform slipped out of Gorbachev's control. The process once under way; had a different direction from the one intended. As it turned out, in a revolutionary situation the masses stirred to activity are a double-edged weapon. Deterioration of the social and economic situation in the country diluted mass support base for the course of *perestroika* and played into the hands of nationalists and left and right wing radicals. Today, having learned the bitter experience of those events, we can mentally try to figure out other scenarios for implementing political reform. Say, a scenario under which we could have directly headed for a presidential republic instead of making inefficient attempts to revive the 'power of the Soviets' serving. We could have nominated the General Secretary as a CPSU candidate to run for President of the country in free democratic election in autumn 1988. A sure victory for Gorbachev in a fair competitive election would have given him the necessary legitimacy and a margin of safety, the lack of which made him vulnerable in dealing with his opponents at crucial moments. A new vertical of executive power could have been created, including governors to be elected or appointed. The 'CPSU problem' demanded as much attention. Turning the ruler of the world's second superpower into an instrument of parliamentary battles was too much even for a Party that had been through a lot of things. Something more inspiring could have been looked for. For instance, convening of an extraordinary Congress of the CPSU, 'the President's party,' in spring 1989, may have been considered. The 'leading and guiding' force may have been oriented towards its transformation into a modern dominant party, keeping the levers to control the state within the framework of democratic institutions (like the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, the Indian National Congress in India, etc.). In order to succeed in the situation of tough competitive struggle against other forces, the Party had to keep pace with society in its political development. Development of inner-party democracy could have been encouraged, based on the platforms, currents, and factions. There was also no need to dramatize a possible 'civilized divorce' resulting in the formation of a social democratic party and a much more traditionalist (Communist) party. It could have laid down a basis for a two-party system, optimal for a presidential republic. Using the Presidency and the dominant party as its base of support, the reformers could have easily taken part in

elections to the Supreme Soviets and other representative bodies without fearing deadly breakthroughs by anti-system forces. In addition to the vitally important consolidation of the state institutions in the transitional period, the above schematically presented plan of actions could have had other positive impacts as well. Specifically, it could have prompted the conservative-minded part of the *nomenklatura* and the party apparatus to keep pace with the reform-minded country's leadership. There could have been two steady anchors to hold them back from going in selfish opposition and engaging in sabotage. The first such anchor could have been their participation in power; this would have outweighed any ideological considerations. The second anchor would be wide-ranging opportunities to privatize state property, in the course of which the ruling elite could have offered its loyal supporters most favored treatment. There are no guarantees as to effectiveness of such a strategy. It is, however, also true that the political reform, the decisive battle of *perestroika*, was in need of a thorough working through of possible scenarios. Judging by the recollections of participants in Gorbachev-led brainstorming sessions, many of the issues raised were actually discussed at the time, however, not thoroughly enough. Besides, unbiased assessment of the pluses and minuses of various plans of actions was also lacking.[26]

Unlike in the case of the first two forks in the road, Gorbachev was brought to the third and last fork in the road by it was the rapidly and highly rising wave of *perestroika* rather than coming to it himself. He felt the first symptoms of an imminent crisis of the national-state structure of the USSR as early as in the mid-1987, when in the atmosphere of *glasnost'* and democracy the movement of the Crimean Tatars suddenly grew more active and ferment started in the Baltic republics, the weakest link of the union state. Half a year later the situation in Karabakh exploded. Behind the Karabakh crisis was an extremely complex tangle of problems of the multinational, multi-confessional and multi-civilizational Soviet Union. By quickly releasing their enormous destructive potentials these national conflicts, put into question the very existence of the Soviet state, federal by its form and unitary in its essence. Unlike with economic and political reforms, Gorbachev had less time for reflections and taking decisions in this sphere. The room for maneuver was narrower. At the beginning, when there was still no direct threat to the Union's integrity, he '... sought to develop a uniform democratic approach towards inter-ethnic disputes.'[27] The ruling CPSU was of no help to its General Secretary.[28] The leadership strongly favoured 'putting things in order.' Party bodies were wary and suspicious of the mushrooming national movements. Used to applying administrative methods of control, the apparatchiks were inferior to the leaders of 'people's fronts' in their ability to work with the masses.[29] In the boiling cauldron of

[26] Medvedev, *op.cit.*, pp. 74-75; Shakhnazarov, *With and Without Leaders,* pp.326-330; Chernyayev, *op.cit.*, p.238.

[27] Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy ,* Book One, p.509.

[28] Looking back, Anatoly Chernyayev states sadly, 'It was not only Ligachev who was unable to act as an 'aide' in solving the 'nationalities question,' but the whole of the then administrative staff. That's where the tragedy lay.' Chernyayev, *op.cit.*, p. 250.

[29] Recalling the reactions of the Party leaders to the bloody events in Tbilisi in spring 1989, Gorbachev writes in his memoirs '...our staff regards the use of political methods

perestroika, Gorbachev found himself standing alone to face the nationalist element he had himself awakened. He felt he was losing the race against time. Themes of underestimated militant nationalism, chronic lagging behind, and forced responses to the situations run like a scarlet thread through his books of memoirs.[30]

Essentially, the choice available to Gorbachev boiled down to either using of force or searching for consensus and entering into cooperation with the national elites that took shape in the federal republics, or proto-states. Both approaches were tried. The result is well known: centrifugal forces tore the multinational Union to pieces and buried it. To what extent was this outcome preprogrammed? The use of force version of the solution to the 'nationalities question,' implying in effect preservation of the union state, was quickly rejected. The events in Alma-Ata in December 1986 became a typical Soviet-style example of the use of force in the *perestroika* period. In their aftermath, on instructions from the Union leadership, force was used very seldom (the developments in Baku in January 1990 being the most illustrative counterexample). Going through the crucible of inter-ethnic conflicts, Gorbachev finally progressed from 'October' to 'February,' from Bolshevism to the democratic political culture. The more heated the atmosphere in the country was, the more filled with the philosophy of non-violence the last Soviet leader became. Both his own experience and the world experience convinced him to embrace non-violence. Gorbachev rejected Russian history, full of bloodshed, and professed primacy of law, democratic principles, humanistic values, and 'new thinking.' He came close in his beliefs to Leo Tolstoi and Mahatma Gandhi. Gorbachev tightened the reins on members of the top brass. Sharing the lessons learnt from the Baku tragedy, he wrote, 'the government cannot do without the use of force in extreme circumstances. However, such an action needs to be justified by absolute necessity and conducted with utmost restraint, while the real solution to the problem is only possible through political means (emphasis added).[31] It is hard not to appreciate the moral message of this stand taken by the omnipotent ruler of the 'Evil Empire.' However, as is know, the devil is in the detail. Should the term 'extreme circumstances' be interpreted as covering only pogroms and mass bloodshed? Did there exist at a certain moment an 'absolute necessity' to stop the destructive activities of the separatists and ultra-radicals, who with outright cynicism defied the Constitution and the laws of the country? What had to be done with those deaf to any reason and ready to go any length to seize power? What could the future hold in store for a state that was voluntarily waiving its constitutional right to legitimate violence? The legitimacy of these questions does not at all undo Gorbachev's truth. His rejection of violence was dictated not only by moral imperatives, but by political considerations as well. Russia's harsh experience suggests that any use of force could quickly bury the democratic ideals of *perestroika* and hopes and dreams of freedom associated with it. Gorbachev flatly refused to herd the people into the kingdom of freedom. However, it was impossible to get there without using the force component. As *perestroika* gathered momentum, spontaneous forces threatened to smash

---

as a sign of weakness. The most important of their arguments is force.' Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy ,* Book One, p. 515.

[30] See Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy ,* Book One, pp. 496, 501, 514, 517, 518; Book Two, p. 499.

[31] Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy ,* Book One, p. 520.

to pieces a state that had lost the ability to defend itself. Looking back, Gorbachev himself describes the trap prepared for him by the Russian history as follows: 'The only thing Gorbachev did was to repudiate violence as the main means to implement state policy. It proved enough to make the state fall to pieces.'[32] It would seem that the legitimate use of force fit into the *perestroika* strategy. In theory, it really did. As seen from the above citation from the post-Baku reflections, Gorbachev admitted such a possibility, too. One of my friends from the university period, a convinced liberal since his young days and a staunch supporter of Gorbachev, gave a brief, military-style, formula of the 'optimum kind of *perestroika*': 'lock 'em up and develop democracy; lock 'em up and develop democracy.' With all its humor, this lapidary formula has a deep meaning to it. In Russia, effective and steady democracy can only take shape, when based on – and at the same time as a negation of (!) – its traditional culture strongly intertwined with violence. Oriented towards extremely high standards of democratic principles, Gorbachev very much lost touch with the native soil. As a result, he found himself to be very vulnerable in the context of the permanent political crisis of 1990-1991.

However, this is only half the truth. The other half of it speaks fully in favour of Gorbachev. The problem – and the trouble – for the Father of *perestroika* lies in the fact that in Russia the legitimate use of force soon gradually degenerates into lawlessness and violence. Here, any breakthrough to freedom claims its huge toll of blood and human lives, and if the Liberator is not ready to pay it voluntarily, history will collect it anyway. Paying such a terrible ransom – be it even for his darling creation – went against the grain for both the initiator of *perestroika* and many of his associates and supporters. Ironically, this very stand has made Mikhail Gorbachev a true historical figure. And it was this stand that has undone *a priori* his heroic efforts to carry the great cause of *perestroika* through to a victorious end. One cannot hope even for miracles when getting into a boxing ring with one's hands tied behind one's back. Having sheathed his sword, Gorbachev could only rely on his skills as a politician. He hoped that the 'nationalities question' would gradually lose its urgency under the healthy influence of the economic and political reforms. However, the partially successful reforms only added fuel to the flame: economic reform pushed the national elites towards the so-called 'republican self-financing pattern' (in fact, the dismemberment of a single economic mechanism), while the political reform aroused appetites of cheeky 'national fronts,' which thought it no longer necessary to make a secret of their separatist intentions. At the critical phase of *perestroika*, nationalists managed to break through to power in many regions, while in some other regions they were hot on the heels of Party leaders, forcing them to pickup their own slogans and demands.

Under such circumstances, it was impossible to keep the Union in its original form and composition. The Baltic Republics would have broken away, whatever the situation. Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and some Central Asian Republics could have followed suit. However, Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, the core of the Union, may have stayed. A few more republics may have possibly joined them. In aggregate, they had the lion's share of the territory, population, resources and potential of the USSR. Under this scenario, the post-Soviet space could have experienced much less shocks. Since he believed it was impossible to keep the state together without the use of

[32] Cited in Grachev, *op.cit.*, p. 301.

force, Gorbachev opted for the latter path. In the context of progressive weakening of the Center and the emergence of the dual power situation,[33] the Federal President and the leaders of the republics started a negotiating marathon, which got the name of the *Novo-Ogaryovo Process*. For the sake of preserving the union state, the USSR President agreed to share power and the federal property with the leaders of the republics representing the interests of the national elites. The Novo-Ogaryovo Process, a 'venture of mind wrecking complexity',[34] resulted in a new Union Treaty, in which the vitally important interests of many parties thereto, in effect, of potential states, were agreed. The open clash between the conservatives and radicals in Moscow in August 1991, which opened the door wide for the action of centrifugal forces, disrupted its signature. Opinions of the Union Treaty that was drafted were widely different. Gorbachev spoke of the '... vital importance of the principles laid down at that stage into the foundation of the renewed federative state system.'[35] Georgy Shakhnazarov, Gorbachev's closest assistant in the 'treaty matters,' agreed with this assessment.[36] However, by no means all people agreed with it then (and agree now). To all appearances, the August coup-plotters disagreed, just like some other influential political figures as well. One of the leading contemporary researchers of *Perestroika* believes that the treaty in effect '...meant termination of the existence of the USSR as a single state.'[37] Despite the virtual nature of this debate by correspondence, I am inclined to think that the assessments given by Gorbachev and Shakhnazarov are more correct. The fact is that they spoke about a *trend* without making predictions as to its possible outcome; while their opponents talk of a real possibility of the union state's disintegration after signature of the Treaty as of *an accomplished fact*. In reality, the fact is different: in its *intended form* the renewed Union could have been a more robust structure than the European Union of today. In fact, the Union Treaty formalized a certain correlation of forces between the Center and the independence-minded republican elites at a critical and extremely unstable moment of the country's political history. The Treaty presented an opportunity to move either way: towards consolidation or the final ruin of the union state. What happened cannot be undone, and it casts an uncertain light onto the most complicated and little-researched history of *perestroika*.

We have touched upon just a thin layer of the range of *perestroika* problems. Many of its most important aspects and features have not even been outlined. The fact is that simultaneously raised and resolved were the issues of foreign policy that were truly crucial both for the country and the world. Preparation and carrying out of diplomatic breakthroughs required much time and great effort; however, their reward was the end of the Cold War on terms acceptable to the USSR. Still another such problem is the role of

---

[33] Both Vadim Medvcdev and Georgy Shakhnazarov cite the date of the emergence of the dual power situation in the country as March-April 1991, in the aftermath of a most severe political crisis that occurred in the beginning of that year.

[34] Shakhnazarov, *With and Without Leaders,* p. 411. Georgy Shakhnazarov, one of the 'fathers' of the future treaty, recalled later, 'This document aroused so much passion and fighting.' Ibid, p. 401.

[35] Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy,* Book Two, p. 550.

[36] Shakhnazarov, *With and Without Leaders,* p. 417.

[37] Barsenkov, *op.cit*., p. 207.

ideology in the policies pursued by *perestroika* leaders. Well known is the fact that democratic humane socialism was and remains Gorbachev's guiding star. Let us assume that Fortune has smiled on him and he has won most fierce battles that fell to his lot. Where could it have brought us? To the 'socialism with a human face', much spoken about, but never seen? Or could it have been a certain version of 'social democratic capitalism,' keeping the most important social achievements of the previous period? Questions, questions, questions ... *Perestroika* has left much more of them than answers.

Eco-nationalism and the crisis of the Soviet empire (1986-1991)

Dmitry V. Efremenko

The political-economic changes started in 1985 under M. S. Gorbachev resulted in a crisis of the state system of the multinational Soviet Union and its downfall in 1991. The latter was one of the important consequences of these changes. The weakening of political and ideological control, the developing of *glasnost'*, the opportunity to discuss formerly taboo subjects resulted in the rise and growth of national movements in the Soviet republics. It also led to the aggravation of old, and appearance of new, interethnic conflicts. Despite essential differences in the level of social and economic development and national identity of the population of the Soviet republics, the dynamics of national processes in different regions shared many traits with each other. One of the phenomena manifested to a greater or lesser extent almost in all Soviet republics, was eco-nationalism. In accordance with J. Dawson's definition[1] we call eco-nationalism the rise of social movements that closely connect problems of environment protection with national purposes, above all with the achievement of state independence or high-grade sovereignty in the structure of the USSR.

It is worth noting that during the period previous to Gorbachev's *perestroika*, the movement for environment protection, together with the movement for protection of historical and cultural monuments, remained one of the few legal, although rather limited, ways to oppose rigid centralization and party dictatorship in Soviet national republics. In the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the discussion on problems of local environment protection developed at the end of 1987 and at the beginning of 1988 became a starting point for the rise of powerful national movements for independence from the Soviet Union. The process began with moderate statements in support of *perestroika* and the necessity of its realization at the republican level. After a few months later this became a sort of avalanche completely out of control of local and central authorities. In Estonia the occasion for protests of local population were plans to construct a large industrial centre of phosphorus production not far from Rakvere. During 1987 there were numerous pickets and demonstrations organized by local ecological groups. At the beginning of 1988 the Estonian mass media began to consider the problems of republican environment protection in a wider political context. In the course of one television discussion economist E. Savissaar called for the creation of a popular front, a mass movement in support of *perestroika* in Estonia. Before viewers' eyes an initiative group was formed, which issued the Declaration of Creation of the Popular Front the next morning. By mid 1988 the Popular Front of Estonia had become the most influential political force in the republic uniting representatives of different social and political groups. In particular, as Savissaar pointed out in his report at the Congress

[1] Dawson J.I., Eco-Nationalism. *Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine*. Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1996.

of the Popular Front of Estonia on October 1-2, 1988, approximately 10 percent of supporters of the Front were connected with ecological groups.

Similar movements during the same period of time appeared in Latvia and Lithuania. In their programs questions of environment protection were thoroughly developed as a part of the strategy aimed at separation from the USSR. In Lithuania the attention of the public interested in ecological problems was concentrated primarily on the work of the nuclear power station in Ignalina. Leaders of the ecological movement pointed out that the recurrence of a nuclear power station accident, comparable with Chernobyl one, would mean a national catastrophe for Lithuania. The Zhemynas public club headed by Z. Vaishvila, a researcher of Institute of Physics, Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, studied the problems of safety at the nuclear power station, and in spring-summer of 1988 organized a number of meetings, press conferences and open hearings which had wide public repercussions. Representatives of the ecological movement drew attention to the fact that two reactors in operation were of the same type as at Chernobyl type and were technologically obsolete. Moreover, the number of unplanned breakdowns and other incidents (including fires) in 1987 considerably increased. At the same time the national note appeared in this discussion. It was connected with the fact that most of the nuclear power station personnel were non-Lithuanians who had previously worked at other Soviet nuclear power stations. In particular, it was noted that there were serious problems in the town of Sniechkus where most of the personnel who worked at the Ignalina nuclear power station lived. Some representatives of the Lithuanian ecological movement interpreted this as an additional reason for anxiety and mistrust. In the summer of 1988 the majority of participants in Lithuanian ecological groups took active part in *Sajudis* (the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika) whose purpose became restoration of the state independence. In view of this purpose, ecological problems, including questions of the functioning of the Ignalina nuclear power station, became one of the central issues for *Sajudis*. One of the most notable actions of *Sajudis* was the organization of 'the Ring of Life' on September 17 1988 when tens of thousands of people built a living chain surrounding the buildings of the Ignalina nuclear power station. The main purpose of the action was to protest against plans to construct a new third power unit at Ignalina and protesters called for an international expert commission to check the reliability of the reactors in operation. More than 20 thousand people took part in the action despite the interdiction of local authorities. The success of this nonviolent protest action confirmed that *Sajudis* had become the most influential political power in Lithuania, capable of resisting both the local communist party and the Union centre. It is worth noting that after Lithuania gained actual and legal independence in September 1991, the Ignalina nuclear power station continued to function, providing steady power supply of the country as well as export of the electric power. The Lithuanian government had to return to the question of closing the Ignalina nuclear power station only in connection with the accession of Lithuania into the European Union.

In Latvia the ecological movement was amalgamated with the movement for national independence too. As early as 1987 a long-standing project to build a hydroelectric power station on the Daugava was finally rejected on ecological grounds. Serious discussions began in connection with ecological consequences of the functioning of the paper and pulp plant in Sloka, the petrochemical terminal in Ventspils, as well as

in connection with the state of water area of the Riga Gulf and the Baltic Sea. Later environment protection requirements were developed in detail and included in the program of the Popular Front of Latvia. This program in many aspects was aimed at gaining the state independence, which in turn was considered as a basic condition for the solution of the major environmental problems.

Eco-nationalism was developed in full measure in the Baltic republics where its role in the formation of national movements for independence was very great. At the same time the participation of representatives of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the work of the new USSR bicameral parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, drew attention to the problems of the environment protection to a great extent. Later they were given much more serious attention at the Union level. Ecological problems raised by the representatives of Baltic republics in many respects coincided with demands of ecological groups in Russia and other republics of the USSR. Most Russian ecological groups took a positive view of the idea of a sovereign Russia as an organic part of the USSR, which was defended by Boris Yeltsin and his supporters, who were in their turn followed the Baltic example.

Ecological movements made national claims in other Soviet republics too although not on such a large scale as in the Baltic republics. For the Byelorussian Popular Front and the Ukrainian *Rukh* a key environmental problem, closely connected with the future of Byelorussian and Ukrainian peoples, were the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. However the Byelorussian Popular Front failed to become a mass national movement, and the Ukrainian *Rukh* was influential only in the western regions of Ukraine and partly in Kiev. Accordingly not so many Byelorussian and Ukrainian ecological groups were ready to have close organizational and political interaction with national movement in their republics. But people affiliated with different parties still supported ecological demands connected with the overcoming of consequences of Chernobyl catastrophe, the termination of construction of new Chernobyl-type reactors, and there was real ecological publicity. No serious political force in Byelorussia and Ukraine, from supporters of independence to adherents of integrity of the united state, could ignore these demands.

The Nagorny Karabakh conflict began when representatives of the Armenian public there put forward a number of ecological demands. However a few days later these demands had already receded into the background, and the central problem of political struggle was the fate of Nagorny Karabakh. At the same time, an obvious concession to the national movement was the closure of the nuclear power station in Metsamor near Yerevan in 1988. However a subsequent power blockade on the part of Azerbaijan that resulted from the Karabakh conflict compelled the Armenian government to reactivate the nuclear power station and transfer managerial and service functions to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy.

Eco-nationalism also manifested itself in Kazakhstan, in particular in connection with the creation of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk non-governmental organization in 1989. The Kazakh poet O. Suleymenov, the leader of this organization, demanded the termination of nuclear tests and the closure of the Semipalatinsk rang. The Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement did not put in far-reaching national claims, but no doubt some ideas of the Kazakh statehood were developed by it.

The phenomenon of eco-nationalism was of great historical importance. Its appearance was caused by the systemic crisis of Soviet Union and the synergy of aggravated environmental problems, the rise of national movements and the impossibility to ruling using traditional command-administrative methods. Eco-nationalism was one of symptoms and at the same time a new impulse for disintegration of the Soviet Union and gaining independence from it. It is worth noting that the connection of national and ecological movements promoted ecological problems as political priorities for the central government in the last years of the USSR. Later when basic national demands were realized, most ecological groups returned to the environment protection problems though up to now it there has been inertia of eco-nationalism in ecological movement in the newly independent states.

Russian Foreign Policy in the 'Near Abroad': Has the Post-imperial Adjustment Happened?

Mikhail A. Molchanov

How to explain the evolution of the Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the USSR? A convenient shorthand employs the label of 'post-imperial,' suggesting that Russia's foreign policy under, first, Yeltsin, and second, successive Putin administrations had largely lost its great power ambitions. More recent studies of Russian international engagements under the Putin-Medvedev guidance are full of such references. Occasionally, observers steer a cautious middle ground between accusing Russia of neo-imperial tendencies, on the one hand, and representing it as an inconspicuous 'normal power,' on the other hand. Then, more creative characterizations of the country's foreign policy, which see it as 'neo-imperial' in nature and direction, are being used.[1] Both 'post-imperial' and 'neo-imperial' labels seem to suggest that Russia has largely overcome its imperialist tendencies. Yet, Vladimir Putin's second term in the office (2004-2008) saw foreign policy turning increasingly nationalistic. This tendency did not subside after Dmitry Medvedev's election to presidency. Aggressive rhetoric and neo-imperial assertiveness characterized Medvedev's conduct of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. It now characterizes Russia's diplomatic offensive in Central Asia and the attempts to transform the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization into the Central Asian analogue of NATO.

Is Russian foreign policy neo-imperial or post-imperial? The prefix 'neo' means the state's willingness to satisfy its great power ambitions at other states' expense. The neighboring states are frequently singled out for such an intervention. The 'post-imperial' policy means the policy that is no longer harboring great power ambitions with regard to other states.

How do we examine the claim of Russia's 'new stealth imperialism' toward the rest of the post-Soviet space?[2] I believe that it is especially instructive to look not only, or even chiefly, at Russia's foreign policy, but also foreign policies of Russia's neighbors, especially larger and more important partners, which Ukraine and Kazakhstan are.

The newly independent states of Ukraine and Kazakhstan have faced a number of similar problems related to economic and political development, reassertion of national sovereignty, and development of a new foreign policy that would be fully in tune with realities of the global era. The immediate reality that the two states had to deal with was that of the demise of the bipolar world system based on confrontation of the two superpowers. Instead, the 'uni-polar moment' of the United States predominance have fast gave way to the emerging multi-polarity, or 'non-polarity,' according to some

[1] Wallender, C. (2007) 'Russian Transimperialism and Its Implications', *The Washington Quarterly* , 30 (2), 107-22.

[2] Smith, K.C. (2004) *Russian energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland and Ukraine. A New Stealth Imperialism?* Washington DC: CSIS.

analyses.[3] Both Kazakhstan and Ukraine sought to build evenly balanced relationships with all major centers of power globally, without discrimination or special privileges extended to any one of them. The term 'multi-vectorism' was used to describe this policy, and got accepted by both domestic and foreign observers as a distinguishing feature of foreign policy of newly independent states. With the election of Dmitry Medvedev as President of the Russian Federation, the idea of multi-vectorism found its way into the official Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2008.

I argue that multi-vectorism is, in fact, little more than the drive to universalize and streamline international relations of a country on a non-preferential basis. Such a universalization, or globalization of the country's foreign policy in the post-Soviet context seems natural. First, new ties to the USA and the West generally speaking need to be developed and fostered. Second, the rise of China and the alternative it presented to the more traditional orientation to advanced industrial economies of the West has had a profound impact on foreign policy determination across Eurasia. Finally, new centers of power emerge in the world. Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors have to deal with this new reality, selectively engaging, disengaging, and re-engaging with these centers.

Orientation toward the West and away from Russia predominated in Ukraine. Orientation toward China and the West with numerous rhetorical assertions of loyalty to Russia has informed foreign policy in Kazakhstan. As Russia itself goes, it has been noted that Russia's foreign policy toward the West speaks of a desire to return to great power politics.[4] At the same time, Moscow lacks many of the instruments of power that it used to wield before. Russia's new found assertiveness in the so-called 'near abroad' of the former Soviet republics, as well as the use of gas trade as a tool of power politics have made some analysts consider a potential backslide to the state of a 'new cold war' between Russia and the West.[5] This pessimistic prognosis glosses over the fact that there are limits to what Russia can achieve in its great power quest. The present state and the evolution of Russia's bilateral relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan betray some of these weaknesses.

Russia's relations with Ukraine

When the USSR ceased to exist, the new Russian elite in Moscow did not consider Ukraine as a problem. On the contrary, it was assumed that Ukraine would not play more than a peripheral role in Russia's foreign policy. Since both ex-Soviet countries were seen as moving into the 'all-European home,' Ukraine's diverging trajectory gave no grounds for concern. The loss of Ukraine could be considered even beneficial, in some way, as it allowed to concentrate resources and focus attention on Russian domestic problems.

This largely dismissive attitude changed when post-Soviet Russian nationalism embraced the idea of the break-up of the USSR as a *Russian* national tragedy. Ukrainians

[3] Haass, R. N. (2008) 'The age of nonpolarity'. *Foreign Affairs*, 87 (3), 44-56.
[4] Mankoff, J. (2009) *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, Lexington: Rowman & Littlefield.
[5] Lucas, E. (2009) *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

were then presented as an integral part of a Russian 'super-nation,' and the attempts to reintegrate started getting genuine attention of policy makers. Even so, it would be false to consider these modest attempts as 'neo-imperialist' in any way. Throughout both of his terms in the office, Boris Yeltsin corrected, downplayed and officially refuted occasional declarations of the State Duma and statements of individual politicians that could have been read as unfriendly toward Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has not digressed from this policy. On several occasions, Putin insisted that sovereignty of the former Soviet republics was irreversible. President Medvedev, in the wake of Russo-Georgian war of 2008, had once again reconfirmed Russia's respect of territorial integrity of Ukraine and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Meanwhile, Ukraine's foreign policy has been criticized for its lack of consistency.[6] Ukraine has not acted as a staunch Russian ally. On the contrary, for more than a decade and a half, it maintained its desire to move closer to NATO and the EU. Same time, it has never developed a pro-European drive even remotely matching the one that was demonstrated by the Visegrad countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Instead, it concentrated on maintaining its largely non-transparent business ties to Russia and the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The alleged Russian 'neo-imperialism' has been, in many instances, the creation of the Ukrainian elites that, first, used Russia to enrich themselves and then, used accusations of imperialism to hide the facts of graft and corruption.

Elites' concern with personal enrichment trumped nation building priorities.[7] The gas trade became exemplary in this regard. Corruption was fostered by the murky deals between the Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs and authorities engaged in gas exports to Europe. These two groups together robbed European and domestic customers. As more than one analysts noted, 'Ukraine's corruption and incomplete economic transition weaken its own energy security – and Europe's'.[8]

National identity and security

Russians were traumatized by the loss of Ukraine. Without Ukraine, or at least that part of it that Russians consider legitimately 'theirs' and call, in pre-revolutionary parlance, 'Malorossia' (Little Russia) and 'Novorossiia' (New Russia), Russian national identity appears fractured. There is little doubt that even outright hostility toward Ukraine's post-communist leadership and its 'treacherous' policies can be largely explained by the fact that Ukraine is closely related to Russia's definitions of its own national identity. In

[6] Molchanov, M.A. (2002) National identity and foreign policy orientations in Ukraine. In J. Moroney, T. Kuzio, and M. Molchanov (Eds.), *Ukraine's foreign and security policy: Theoretical and comparative perspectives* (pp. 227-263) Westport, CT: Praeger.

[7] Chudowsky, V. (2002) 'The Limits of Realism: Ukrainian policy towards the CIS', In J. Moroney, T. Kuzio, and M. Molchanov (Eds.), *Ukraine's foreign and security policy: Theoretical and comparative perspectives* (pp. 11-36) Westport, CT: Praeger, 18.

[8] Chow, Edward and Elkind, Jonathan (2009) Where East meets West: European gas and Ukrainian reality. *The Washington Quarterly.* 32(1), 77-92.

Russia's relations with Ukraine lies a problem of Russia's perception of itself: imperial, rather than simply nationalist; post-hegemonic, yet often revanchist toward its ex-Soviet neighbors; sentimentally nostalgic in its visions of the past glory.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's post-Soviet identity has moved far away and in the direction opposite from Russia's. The nationalist ('nationally conscious') Ukrainians prefer to see their country with the West and deny its historic and ethno-cultural ties to Russia. Listening to the nationalist rhetoric, the pro-Russian Ukrainians suspect ulterior motifs and the self-serving power grab masquerading as the protection of national interests, and decry what they see as detrimental consequences of these policies to Ukraine's economy and society at large. Any government elected by such a society would have to oscillate between the opposing notions of identity and the correspondingly opposed directions in foreign policy. This schizophrenic split in definition of the country's national interests cannot but affect its foreign partnerships.

Although former Ukraine's President Victor Yushchenko recognized the importance of Russia, his six years in the office were characterized by clear deterioration of interstate relations between the two countries.[9] Dmitry Medvedev dismissed Yushchenko's position on Ukraine's 1932-33 famine as a 'genocide' by the Soviet authorities and accused Ukrainian president of harbouring an anti-Russian agenda. Diplomatic sanctions that followed included a deliberate delay in sending an ambassador to Ukraine in 2009 because of the 'anti-Russian course of the Ukrainian leadership.' Another point of contention between the two leaders was Ukraine's bid for a seat on NATO, which Russia viewed as a security threat. Medvedev decried Ukraine's support for Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili during the brief Russian-Georgian war in 2008 as blatantly 'anti-Russian.'

Yushchenko's official representations of its nationalist organizations of the World War II period as bona fide 'national liberation' groups provoked an angry reaction in Moscow. Russian historiography views these groups, OUN-UPA in particular, as a conglomerate of pro-fascist, terrorist bands of Nazi collaborators. Meanwhile, Yushchenko even went so far as to award the OUN leader Stepan Bandera the title of 'Hero of Ukraine'. In response, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs promulgated a UN resolution on 'Inadmissibility of certain practices which contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.' In this document Russia expressed its anger at the fact that 'Ukrainian leadership is trying to equate in legal status former OUN-UPA fighters and veteran antifascists,' asserting that 'this attitude of Kyiv is immoral and insulting towards the Ukrainian World War II veterans' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2008). In February 2010, the European Parliament released a statement saying that it 'deeply deplores the decision by the outgoing President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, posthumously to award Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which collaborated with Nazi Germany, the title of 'National Hero of Ukraine'.[10]

---

[9] Fawkes, H. (2006, March 20) Ukraine and Russia seek new chapter. *BBC News.* Retrieved December 15, 2010 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news.

[10] European Parliament (2010, 25 February) European Parliament resolution of 25 February 2010 on the situation in Ukraine. Retrieved December 15, 2010 from:

The Russian-Ukrainian conflicts over gas prices and alleged gas theft by Ukraine had jeopardized European energy security in 2006 and 2009. In late 2005, Gazprom raised Ukraine's gas prices from the $50 per 1,000 cubic meters to as much as $230 per 1,000 cubic meters.[11] In 2009, Russia had briefly cut off the supply of gas to Ukraine, blaming Ukraine's unwillingness to pay its debt for the incident. The crises unfolded in parallel to the overall deterioration of the strategic and military components of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Because of that, some critics accused Russia of 'energy imperialism.' However, more than one industry analyst had agreed that Russian decisions to interrupt supply were made in accordance with standard business practices.

Russia has attempted to engage Ukraine more actively via the multilateral medium of the Commonwealth of Independent States. While rejecting Russia's 'diktat', Ukraine had also essentially rejected the multilateral negotiations path offered by Moscow. Ukraine's participation in the CIS has never been enthusiastic. It participated mostly in the CIS areas deemed 'useful' as a supplement to the country's cash-strapped budget, such as pensions, the military-industrial complex or transportation. The CIS security-related provisions were rejected out of fear of Russian domination. This resulted in a puzzling situation when Ukraine participated 'in the CIS air defence system, but not a customs union, while at the same time holding NATO military exercises on its territory and demanding attention from the European Union'.[12] Only recently, the situation started to change. On February 22, 2011 President Yanukovych stated that Ukraine will 'step up' its participation in the CIS with regard to trade and economic cooperation.[13]

The Yanukovych turn

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have warmed considerably in the short period since the current president Viktor Yanukovych was elected in February 2010. Known for his pro-Russian sympathies, Yanukovych proceeded to reverse much of the policies of his predecessor that were especially annoying to the Kremlin. On November 26, 2010, Yanukovych and Medvedev signed the minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Ukrainian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission and come to consensus on many other important bi-lateral documents pertaining to things like cooperation of inspection regarding the Black Sea Fleet deployment, agriculture, transportation over the Kerch Straight, outer space exploration, cooperation regarding oil refineries and other issues pertaining to foreign affairs. The two presidents met at the Gorki residence, former

---

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0035+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.

[11] Chivers, CJ (2006) 'Putin Offers 3 Month Extension of Ukraine's Gas Subsidy.' The New York Times. January 1 2006. Retreived January 17, 2011 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/international/europe/01russia.html?ref=viktor_a_yushchenko.

[12] Chudowsky, op.cit, 29-31.

[13] NRCU (2011, February 21) 'Ukraine to step up its participation in CIS' Retrieved February 22, 2011 from http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148&listid=140212 .

presidential residence in Russia, and Yanukovych was welcomed by Medvedev with considerable warmth.[14]

In his first year in the office, Yanukovych appointed Ukraine's former Ambassador to Russia as his foreign minster; replaced a top Ukrainian Navy official who was openly opposed to Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol with someone more receptive to the base; gave individual regions of Ukraine the right to use Russian as their official language; reversed Yushchenko's position on Holodomor as a Soviet-induced Ukrainian tragedy; and even established closer relations to popular Orthodox churches loyal to Moscow as opposed to the anti-Moscow Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[15] Yanukovych made it very clear that Ukraine is indeed a friend of Russia. The question remains as to whether Russia will be capable of showing a genuine leadership in the way of repairing its relations with Ukraine, or whether the business interests of Russian oligarchs will take the precedence once again, as recent attempts to buy the vital sectors of Ukraine's industry seemingly demonstrate.

During the September 2010 meeting in Zavidovo (Russia), the two presidents discussed furthering of the cross-border cooperation. As a result, over 100 new pedestrian crossings were opened along the Russian-Ukrainian frontier. The next month at Gelendzhik the talks continued and led to an agreement to build a bridge in the Kerch area, connecting Russia to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Yanukovych said, 'As soon as we build the bridge, everything will change in the Crimea and the Caucasus. It is an international transport corridor, which will empower our region to develop faster'. Before the agreement was reached, the bridge issue had been described as 'a bone of contention between the two countries since the collapse of the Soviet Union'.[16] Thus, it is fair to say that the Russian-Ukrainian relations have been improving in some of the more sensitive areas inherited from the previous administrations.

In the first half of 2010, trade turnover between the two countries increased by more than 70 percent. At the fourth meeting of the Ukrainian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission in November 2010, Yanukovych called for 'synchronization and modernization' of the Ukrainian and Russian economies, and claimed a significant progress in improving bilateral ties in the areas of nuclear energy, ship building, aircraft manufacturing and space exploration industries. Yanukovych also predicted further harmonization of relations between Russia and Ukraine in 2011, and pledged a new 'constitutional approach' to resolving some outstanding issues between the two countries.[17]

---

[14] Official Website of Victor Yanukovych (Updated May 17, 2010) Retrieved January 18, 2011 from: http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/17167.html

[15] Petro, N. (2010) 'Reversing field: A Ukraine-Russia partnership the West can support' *The American Interest Online*. November-December 2010.

[16] RIA Novosti (2010 November 19) 'Ukraine-Russia dispute over Kerch Strait unresolved- Yanukovych'. Retrieved December 16, 2010 from: http://en.rian.ru/world/20101129/ 161549881.html

[17] Ukrainian News Agency (2010 November 26) 'Yanukovych calls for synchronization and modernization of Ukrainian and Russian economies'. Retrieved January 13, 2011 from: http://un.ua/eng/article/299322.html

The mooring rights for Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol was one of the points of contention between the two countries. In December 2008, Yushchenko called for decommissioning of the base. However, Yanukovych completely reversed this policy and proceeded to extend the basing rights of the fleet until the year 2047, in exchange for a 30 percent reduction in what Ukraine pays for its gas imports from Russia until 2019. This deal promises to save the country 1-3 billion dollars in energy costs annually. Political opponents criticized Yanukovych for the lack of discussion and a haste with which the agreement was signed.[18] However, the Black Sea Fleet provides 15-20 percent of local revenues to Sevastopol, and the deal will result in a steady use of Ukrainian services and goods. It is also seen as beneficial for international security in the region.[19]

As sympathetic to Russia's interests as Yanukovych appears, the evidence suggests that he certainly not inclined toward becoming a Russian pawn. At the May 2010 summit, the two leaders discussed further cooperation on energy, aviation and culture, however Ukraine balked at the notion of a wholesale turnover of key industries to Russia. 'President Yanukovych even struck a dissonant note by pressing for Russia's retreat from the South Stream gas pipeline, a project that could undermine Ukraine's role as a gas transit powerhouse'.[20] There is little evidence of the wholesale reassertion of Russian control, since the government of Ukraine refuses to choose between Europe and Russia. The recent reduction in tension between NATO and Russia may bode well for Ukraine's cooperation with its partners east and west.

Though the future appears promising, one cannot ignore the problematic past. It is in the joint interests of Russia, Ukraine, CIS and the European Union to have strong, mutually beneficial relations. One can only hope that mature pragmatism and the positive signs that Medvedev's administration shown in its dealings with Ukraine are indicative of a new, respectful relationship that belies the idea of neo-imperialism as a driving force of Russia's foreign policy.

Russia's relations with Kazakhstan

The foreign policy of Kazakhstan has garnered a considerable amount of attention and was deemed generally quite successful in comparison to other former Soviet states. Where other former Soviet republics have suffered various economic and/or security setbacks in their struggle to develop independent statehood and assert sovereignty internationally, Kazakhstan under President Nursultan Nazarbayev has emerged in the decades following independence with a strong economy and a central government that is fully in control of the country's domestic and foreign policies. Kazakhstan's foreign

[18] Motyl, Alexander (2010) 'Ukrainian blues: Yanukovych's rise, democracy's fall'. *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2010. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66447/alexander-j-motyl/ukrainian-blues.

[19] Petro, op. cit.

[20] Karatnycky, Adrian (2010) 'A European State that has Friendly Ties with Russia.' *New Atlanticist: Policy and Analysis Blog.* June 2 2010. Retrieved Jaunary 5, 2011 from: http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/european-state-has-friendly-ties-russia

policy was defined as 'multi-vector,' which implies an attempt to secure an evenly balanced relationship with all major centers of power in the world without discrimination or special privileges extended to any one of them.

The sources of Kazakhstan's foreign policy

The sources of Kazakhstan's multi-vectorism are threefold. First, the country's strategic geographic location between Russia and China, on the one hand, Russia and South Asia, on the other hand, cannot but open it to influences coming form various global quarters. Second, the post-communist Russia itself had played with an idea of multi-vector orientation, suggesting it as a proper modus operandi for a new era in its foreign policy, now devoid of ideological and confrontational elements of the cold war period. This approach, pioneered by the first Yeltsin administration in the immediate aftermath of Russia's short-lived 'Atlanticist' moment, was swiftly copied by Kazakhstan. Finally, as a resource-rich country, Kazakhstan must seek to maximize its seller's advantages by developing relations with potential buyers worldwide.

Kazakhstan' s historical, geopolitical and economic circumstances have all made multi-vectorism the most viable option for the emerging state. Historically, Kazakh elites are used to living in Russia's shadow, and the long China's shadow before that. The voluntary accession to the Russian Empire that Kazakh tribal leaders at the time chose as the least harmful option had had profound influences on the development of the Kazakh ethnic nation and post-Soviet statehood. Geopolitics of an exposed landlocked location at the crossroads of transcontinental routes from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the Indian oceans problematizes security and dictates the necessity of good relations with neighbours. Economically, Kazakhstan should rely on its resource endowments and adopt a strategy of export-led growth, which, naturally, cannot be circumscribed through overreliance on one market only.

The multi-ethnic composition of society, the traditionally elevated status of ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan and the Russophone super-minority concentrated in the northern part of the country adjacent to southeastern Urals and west Siberia had all to be taken into account by any post-independence government. Cummings has argued that Nazarbayev used multi-vectorism to legitimize regime's standing with both ethnic Kazakhs and Russians.[21] While Kazakhstan's national identity was weak and underdeveloped, the government used foreign policy as a tool of 'Kazakhization.' The 'Eurasian bridge' rhetorics that Nazarbayev attempted to sell to the country's Western and Eastern partners alike appeared as a surrogate identity claim that was crafted with great care to achieve a degree of distancing from Russia without deliberately alienating Kazakhstan's significant Russian minority.

[21] Cummings, S. (2003) Eurasian bridge or murky waters between East and West? Ideas, identity and output in Kazakhstan's foreign policy. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 19 (3) pp. 139-155, at 150.

The policy manifestations

While speaking of 'blood ties' between Russian and Kazakhs, Nazarbayev's ideologists went to great lengths to ensure that interstate ties would not extend far beyond the realm of trade and mutually beneficial economic interactions, and Kazakhstan would always be treated 'as an equal partner'.[22] On the one hand, the fact that Russia controls the majority of pipeline export from Kazakhstan and, until recently, held a monopoly on pipelines for all of its hydrocarbon exports[23] is an excellent example of the necessity of close relations to Russia. On the other hand, overreliance on one partner can circumscribe national sovereignty. Kazakhstan's Chinese 'vector' is best understood against this background, since it was called forth to balance the unwanted aspects of the country's economic dependency on its former Soviet patron. On July 11, 2009, with the completion of the mid-west section of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, China National Petroleum Corporation started shipping oil from the Caspian Sea fields directly to China's western province of Xinjiang. The fact that Kazakhstan is actively exploring options for alternative pipeline routes is indicative of the country's continued work toward economic independence through multi-vectorism.

To Astana, multi-vectorism is much more than a doctrine of foreign policy. It is an overarching concept which influences both the country's foreign and domestic policies, formulating to best serve the short and long-term interests of the state. While this paper does not explore the domestic side of multi-vectorism at length, it is important to understand that elements of its influence can be found in many aspects of Astana's domestic policies, particularly those aimed at the formulation of a distinct Kazakh identity through 'nationalizing' policies in the 1990's. The careful formulation of a distinctly 'Eurasian' society, which both asserts the sovereignty and uniqueness of Kazakhstan, while not offending the ethnic Russian community to the point of mass upheaval was a key component in the foundation of Kazakh multi-vectorism.

Cummings notes two primary ways in which nationalization policies have manifested themselves in Kazakhstan's foreign policy.[24] The first is the sponsoring of repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs from the former Soviet Union, China, Mongolia, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The second is the placements of ethnic Kazakhs to the leading positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies around the world. Thus accomplished, nationalization policies have eliminated both the danger of ethnic Russian separatism and the lingering perceptions that the country's foreign policy could be dictated from Moscow.

As a major exporter of hydrocarbon resources, Kazakhstan is compelled to attract as many potential trade partners as possible. This pragmatic need, which would have influenced the conduct of the country's international relations under any

[22] Hanks, R. (2009) 'Multi-vector politics' and Kazakhstan's emerging role as a geo-strategic player in Central Asia. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies,* 11 (3) pp. 257-267, at 264.

[23] Kommersant (2007) Russian Transit Monopoly in Central Asia Broken. *Kommersant Daily News,* retrieved January 23, 2011 from: http://www.kommersant.com/p796916/r_500/hydrocarbons _transport/.

[24] Cummings, op.cit.

government, have found additional support in rather unique character of Kazakhstan's nationalizing policies. In contradistinction to mono-ethnic nationalism of the political elites in such countries as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or even Ukraine, nationalizing discourses in Kazakhstan have often focused on emphasizing the 'Eurasian' nature of the Kazakh people. Nazarbayev once argued that the best mascot for the country would be the locally revered snow leopard, an animal that possesses both 'western elegance and eastern wisdom,' fiercely independent but 'never the first to attack anyone'.[25] The national identity that the post-communist government in Kazakhstan has forged for its people appeared genuinely cosmopolitan and, by design, receptive to the cultures of its partners far and near.

Regional institutions as an identity vehicles

As a successor state to the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was a charter member of the Shanghai Five – a loosely institutionalized forum that sprang up from the Sino-Soviet negotiations on border delimitation and confidence building measures along the extended common border. Soon enough, it progressed to the present Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multifunctional regional institution that deals with a host of issues from coordination of security and antiterrorism policies to military cooperation to economic aid and development. Most importantly, it opens a privileged access to Russia and China simultaneously, presenting Kazakhstan with opportunities for power brokerage that goes well beyond simple manoeuvring between the two. Same time, Kazakhstan also actively engages with NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme and regularly sends officers for training in the United States as part of the US Military Education and Training Initiative. In 2005 the United States and Kazakhstan cooperated in approximately 45 joint military events, including joint military exercises, a doubling of activities since 2002.[26] Kazakhstan became the only state in Central Asia to send a small contingent of troops to Iraq. Kazakhstan also plays an independent role in regional security through participation in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA). This organization of 21 member states is not only an active regional voice, but, as of recent, became a 'global talking point' that can be brought to bear on a vast array of issues.[27]

While Kazakhstan has been a considerable force in regional security in Central Asia on its own, it has always emphasized the value of regional cooperation. It was argued by Umirserik Kasenov, Kazakhstan's 'architect' of pan-Eurasian policy integration, that regional cooperation would help re-enforce the sovereignty of individual states by accelerating their economies and solving emerging problems and contradictions

[25] Nazarbayev, N. (2003) Strategy: Kazakhstan 2030. Retrieved January 19, 2011 from: http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/content/reference/strategy 2030.
[26] United States Department of State (Last updated April 20, 2009) Background Note: Kazakhstan. Retrieved December 3, 2010 from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5487.htm
[27] *The Hindu*, June 9, 2010.

among them.[28] For this reason, regional cooperation has had and continues to be and important aspect of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. The country plays an important leadership role in inter-Eurasian cooperation.

Kazakhstan has been an active promoter of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since its inception. It is also a key player in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), where Russia plays the leading role. In February 2010, Kazakhstan's parliament ratified an agreement on establishing the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) of the CSTO, which Russia had been advocating for some time. CPRF may well be used for power projection in the region: not only by Russia, but by Kazakhstan as well.

Parallel to that, Kazakhstan intensifies its cooperation with NATO. In June 2009, Astana hosted the third forum of NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) – the first-ever event of this sort held in the former Soviet space. NATO invited Kazakhstan to join the international peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, and in October 2010 Nazarbayev announced sending several Kazakhstani troops to serve at the ISAF headquarters. An agreement for the transit of the US personnel and equipment via Kazakhstan's airspace to Afghanistan was signed in November 2010.

In January 2010, Kazakhstan became the first post-Soviet state to chair the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – a position typically occupied by a Western democratic state. The OSCE is a group of 56 states who together 'form the largest regional security organization in the world'. It was created in the 1970s to open a permanent channel of communication on security-related issues between the USSR and the West. While its decisions are not legally binding, the organization does serve an important purpose, enhancing security and protection of human rights on the continent. In addition to the traditional considerations of political and military security, OSCE branched out into the non-traditional, economic and environmental security, and has significantly evolved its 'human dimension' over the years. It continues to function as an 'instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation'.[29] Kazakhstan's ascension to the OSCE chairmanship symbolically reaffirms international recognition of the success of its multi-vector diplomacy and is demonstrative of its increasing level of influence.

Kazakhstan's formal membership and activities in various regional integration and security organizations enhance the country's standing and award the regime international recognition that it craves. However, not only the contents, but also the style of foreign policy counts. The way in which Kazakhstan relates to the world's major powers is subtle and unique. Its success is dependent on one variable: the leaders' ability to engage with diverse actors that may be in a competitive, if not outright confrontational, relationship with each other without compromising the integrity of the republic's foreign policy. The first principle that must be followed to make it happen is the unwavering refusal to commit the country fully to politics of alliances, thus banding with any single power or a group of powers explicitly in opposition to the rival power or

[28] Gleason, G. (2001) 'Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum'. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53 (7), 1077-1095, at 1078.

[29] OSCE (2010) 'Facts and Figures'. Retrieved January 15, 2010 from http:// www.osce.org/about/19298.html.

the alliance it may lead. Thus, Kazakhstan's foreign policy does not neatly fit the precepts of the realist/neorealist school in foreign policy analysis and international relations theory. The second principle, which represents an affirmative mirroring of the first, is the government's enthusiastic embrace of most foreign overtures coming from governments and business alike, provided they serve the country's national interest broadly understood and do not antagonize its other partners. Astana's refusal, in June 2010, to send its troops to Kyrgyzstan as part of a peacekeeping force under the umbrella of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization is an example of implementation of these ideas in practice.

The Russian vector

Economically, Kazakhstan was heavily dependent on Russia at the time of independence. This vulnerability was especially pronounced in its energy industry. When Russia and Kazakhstan were both parts of a unified economic complex of the Soviet Union, their economies were intentionally constructed and managed in such a way as to become inseparable parts of the whole. While Russia's economy maintained a degree of diversification, Kazakhstan's economy did not. Energy accounted for as much as 32 percent of Kazakhstan's imports in the early-to-mid-1990s, in spite of the country's vast national resources of hydrocarbons. Since Kazakhstan lacked independent refining capacities, oil that was locally extracted had to be sent to Russia for processing. Conversely, Kazakhstan's own refineries mainly processed Siberian crude. Furthermore, all export pipelines inherited from the former Soviet Union circumvented the Kazakh territory, which made the country dependent on Russia for its exports further abroad. [30]

Strategically, it is imperative that Kazakhstan foster strong relations with its northern neighbour. The country shares the largest border with Russia among the post-Soviet states and is the only Central Asian republic to do so. At the time of independence, ethnic Russians comprised nearly half of the country's population, concentrated primarily in the northwest. It was speculated that separatist inclinations within the ethnic Russian community could pose a territorial threat to the country. Moreover, Kazakhstan lacked trained military personnel of its own and was dependent on Russia for military protection, particularly with regards to its large border with China. The PRC was also seen as a potential threat to the country's sovereignty. In the early years of independence, western experts gave rather grim assessments of Kazakhstan's geopolitical situation and strategic vulnerability, emphasizing such factors as the country's landlocked status and remoteness from the open sea lanes, its corresponding dependence on transportation corridors controlled by its neighbours, and the ethno-cultural divisions inherited from the former Soviet Union.

It is for these reasons that Kazakhstan was the most reluctant and one of the final republics to declare independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The country's interconnected relationship to Russia meant that, while President Nazarbayev was ready to embrace economic sovereignty, he advocated gradual economic reforms which would

[30] Ipek, P. (2007) 'The Role of Oil and Natural Gas in Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy: Looking East or West?' *Europe-Asia Studies*, 59(7) pp. 1179-99, at 1180-81.

not disrupt the existing political order. Just as the Nazarbayev regime would seek gradual economic reforms, so too would it gradually seek to foster stronger relationships abroad; however, the imperative for strong relations with Russia dominated at independence and continue to dominate, albeit to a lesser extent at present.

Geography works in Russia's favour in regard to the export of Central Asian hydrocarbon resources. Central Asian states must continue to export oil and gas to the West via Russian state-owned pipelines. In order to bypass this, an alternative route via the Caspian sea has been proposed, but has not yet materialized. Because control of the Caspian was a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran, no current agreement has been arrived at defining its legal status.[31] While Kazakhstan has advocated for the demarcation of the Caspian Sea, this complication has given Russia a legal advantage in the control over Central Asian hydrocarbon export.

Despite Kazakhstan's attempts to seek alternative routes for its exports of hydrocarbons, its business relationship with Russia has nevertheless strengthened significantly in the last decade. In 2000 and 2001, Gazprom, Russia's state-owned and largest natural gas corporation was invited to take control of the Kazakh distribution network. In 2006, Russia further agreed to develop Kyrmangazy and Kvhalinsky-3 oil and gas fields in a fifty/fifty partnership with Kazakhstan. In May 2007, a gas transit partnership between Russia and Turkmenistan made Kazakhstan and Russia partners in the transit of Turkmen gas. Currently, the discussions are under way about building a Caspian-Black Sea canal through the Russian territory to boost Kazakhstan's trade with the West.

While Kazakhstan's relations with Russia are often prioritized, the multi-vector orientation compels Astana to seek alternative options for foreign relations in order to maximize benefits that might accrue to the state. Russia must now compete with other world powers for influence on its increasingly attractive partner. Because of this, the Russian government made little mention about the status of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan during the period of Nazarbayev's 'nationalization' policies.[32] On the other hand, because of its growing economic clout, Kazakhstan is able to act independently and gain an advantageous position in its partnership with the erstwhile Soviet counterpart. The two states both tread cautiously not to affect each other's sensibilities and preserve the mutually beneficial partnership that they managed to develop.

In May 2008, Dmitri Medvedev chose to meet with President Nazarbayev in Astana for his first official trip as President of Russia. It is believed that Medvedev is taking after his predecessor Vladimir Putin in viewing Kazakhstan as the 'lynchpin' of Russia's attempts to gain dominance over the Caspian Basin energy resources. His visit has been viewed as part of 'a long string of contacts designed to curry the favour of Nazarbayev.' While there was much praise for bilateral relations between the states from both leaders, tensions arose over Nazarbayev's support for a canal linking the Caspian with the Black Sea. To clarify the country's position, Nazarbayev, at one point, felt it

[31] Nygren, B. (2008) 'Putin's use of natural gas to re-integrate the CIS region'. *Problems of Post Communism*. 55 (4) pp. 3-15, at 8.

[32] Dokuchayeva, A.V. et al (1997) 'Expert analysis: The Republic of Kazakhstan and Russia's interests'. *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 27 (49) pp. 1-5

necessary to reassure Moscow, proclaiming that 'we never intend to by-pass anyone, still less Russia, if the opportunities are provided'.[33]

Russia's policy toward Kazakhstan has changed dramatically since the fall of the Soviet Union. While Kazakhstan was largely treated as a junior partner in the 1990s, the country has become increasingly important to Moscow's international strategy. For this reason, Moscow has increasingly used soft power tactics, such as economic benefits, to gain influence in Kazakhstan. While Russia has a military-strategic advantage over other regional actors, the success of the Kazakh multi-vectorism means that Moscow must increasingly adopt policies and incentives similar to those of its competitors to maintain influence in the country.

Conclusion

Multi-vectorism allowed policy makers in Kazakhstan to maximize the country's potential as a mature member of the international community. Multi-vectorism in Ukraine has yet to bring comparable results. Same can be said about the claims of multi-vectorism advanced by the Kremlin.

Comparing these three countries' foreign policies to each other with respect to their principles, orientations, success stories and challenges, it is not hard to conclude that the available evidence is largely inconclusive. On the one hand, Russia's foreign policy is no longer imperialist in a classical sense. Strictly speaking, we can not even call it neo-imperialist – while the rhetoric is often reminiscent of great power ambitions, the actual objectives and real achievements of Russian foreign policy are much more modest and limited in scope. On the other hand, it is not quite post-imperialist either. Moscow consistently attempts to exploit existing weaknesses of the 'near abroad' governments and gain unilateral material advantages for Russian business majors, as well as geopolitical advantages for the Russian state.

Inconsistencies in foreign policy throughout the post-Soviet region may well be attributed to fragmentation of power structures and persistent, pervasive corruption. The Putin-Medvedev regime has not succeeded in freeing the country from corruption; if anything, it let the state 'owe' it even more than before. Corruption and collusion between the Russian state and major business interests cannot but affect the conduct of Russian foreign policy. Corruption is also the standing factor in foreign policy of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. While it may hinder Ukraine's relations with the West, it could have equally applied to Kazakhstan. The country fares little better on Transparency International's corruption perception index, where it scores 2.9 to Ukraine's 2.4.[34]

---

[33] Eurasianet (2008, 22 May) 'Russia-Kazakhstan: Medvedev tries to pick up where Putin Left off'. Retrieved January 8, 2011 from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ insight/articles/ eav052308.shtml .

[34] Transparency International (2010) 'Annual Corruption Perception Index'. Retrieved February 22, 2011 from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_ indices/cpi/2010/results.

Nationalism affected foreign policies of these three states differently. In Russia, official nationalism was proclaimed as a replacement of former imperialism. However, this ideological orientation is clearly at odds with another proclamation – of multi-vectorism in foreign policy. If post-imperial adjustment is to happen, multi-vectorism should be liberated from narrow nationalism. Instead, national pragmatism should dictate the conduct of less capricious and less arrogant foreign policy. Neo-imperial arrogance shows itself particularly in Russia's relations with its former Soviet friends –such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This is where Moscow should primarily extend efforts to keep them as such – friends – without alienating its partners unnecessarily, exploiting their weaknesses or seeking to gain one-sided advantages.

Ukraine's tradition of ethno-nationalism had long been present and misled the country's post-independence strategies. The ethno-cultural divisions between Ukraine's Russophones and Ukrainophones compelled the leaders toward oscillation between Russia and the West. In Kazakhstan, 'nationalization' policies served to marginalize ethnic Russians and promote titular nationality. However, these policies did not spill over into the conduct of foreign policy. The latter remained open, pragmatic and was used to advance Kazakhstan's national interests broadly understood, without excluding Russian ethnic minorities from the benefits of the policy.

'Women scientists resemble guinea-pigs …' Female Academics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia: Social Status and the Transformation of Discriminatory Practices

Natalia Pushkareva

> Women scientists resemble guinea pigs. Guinea pigs are neither Guinean nor real pigs, women scientists are neither scientists nor women (post-Soviet folklore).

The anthropology of professionals, including academics, is a new branch of social and cultural anthropology. It lies at the intersection of ethnology, and qualitative sociology, using depth interviews, included observation and case studies as principal methods and types of research.

The gender focus in my research project emphasizes examination of the practice of power relations in the academic community, rather than a conventional description of the social and professional lives of men and women. By emphasizing power, my project draws upon feminist theory to provide methodological approaches.

Investigation of women academics' everyday life provides fertile soil for validation of the methods adopted in the feminist anthropology. Responding to the appeal of German historians researching 'everyday life' ('Grabe, wo Du stehst!', Dig where you stand!) Bulgarian, Belarusian and Russian researchers have developed a project focusing on women scholars' routine realities in the socialist and post-socialist periods. Specifically, my project focuses on women employed in the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences who have managed to succeed in their professional advancement and creativity.

This project is not focused merely on a description of the observed phenomena, but on gaining insight into the mechanisms of change, and modes of the replication of gender asymmetry. For that purpose, the research has compiled both typical and atypical cases. Project participants work from the hypothesis that even successful women who have doctoral degrees and the rank of professor (an equivalent of tenure) experience discrimination. Discrimination mechanisms are reproduced via ethical and cultural stereotypes that suppress both overt and latent forms of female dominance in the academic environment.

All our respondents consented to narrate their professional and private lives. Usually, professionals observe taboos with regards to working with members of the groups to which they belong: doctors are reluctant to operate on doctors, and psychoanalysts avoid undergoing analysis themselves. However, I did not experience a similar polarization from the subjects of my research. On the contrary, my female respondents wanted to know how their own stories correlated with those of other women and how they fit into the larger study. This was not only a manifestation of curiosity (so often regarded as a female trait), but of professional inquisitiveness. For many of these women, their professional work, even when it is low-paid (underpaid) and

is of low prestige, is a means of self-realization. One respondent even termed it a 'diagnosis': 'Medieval studies for a woman is not a profession, it's a diagnosis'.

Even in Moscow, the potential pool of respondents is rather small, but their stories are particularly revealing, exhibiting a certain typology based on age, discipline, social and psychological makeup and other factors. This group can serve as a basis for studying how the subordinate, marginalized social status of women in the academic community replicates the existing cultural stereotypes. Three anecdotes about women scientists are particularly revealing:

> Women scientists resemble guinea pigs. Like guinea pigs, they are neither Guinean nor pigs; and so women scientists are neither scientists nor women.
>
> A man in an elite dressmaker's says:
> 'I want you to sew lined underpants for me!'
> 'What for?'
> 'My wife is a scientist: she prefers researching things to attaining the final result.'
>
> A woman parasitologist says, while looking in the microscope:
> 'Is there some reason you, pest, have been absent for so long…?'

The first and second texts reveal an *object-based approach* towards women. The author of the first text, a man, claims for himself the right to judge women both as specialists (*neither scientists*) and as bearers of a certain gender role enjoined upon her by society, at which she fails (*nor women*).

In second text, the very essence of women scientists' work is ridiculed; her 'scientific research' is reduced to the butt of a joke. The comic effect is intensified through the conflict between women's traditional gender role of attaining a 'result' (that is, fulfilling her reproductive function) and her scientific activity of research. Thus, this second anecdote deprecates both the woman's role as a scholar and her status as a 'real' woman. A participant in an internet chat room posted a comment pertinent to this anecdote: 'If a woman lacks humor, she should be a scientist.' One should also note that in Russian the same word is used to describe scientists in any field, including those who deal with social sciences.

The third text shows the woman acting in her capacity as a scientist, but her scientific objectivity is replaced by a subjective, 'feminine' subjectivity. Instead of a capable scientist, the anecdote features a common cultural stereotype: the nagging housewife waiting for her husband, who (as usual, comes home late from work). Although the wife is annoyed with her husband, she does not throw him out. In Russia, women are supposed to be afraid of being left alone; the social role of a married woman is more prestigious than that of a single one and especially divorced.

All three of these anecdotes about women scientists appeared in the post-Soviet period, amidst the *third wave* of female entry into the Russian scientific academic community. The first wave occurred in the 1920s, under the auspices of Soviet policy aimed at eliminating the gender asymmetry in science. The second wave occurred in the 1960s, when additional employment opportunities in academic institutions were created.

The third wave came about in the so-called post-*perestroika* period; it was connected with the outflow of men into more lucrative activities, and with brain drain abroad. At present, women make up 33.7% of academic employees, although this overall figure includes the overrepresentation of women in humanities institutions, where they exceed 50%. The increasing presence of women in academic institutions has resulted both in positive accomplishments and in a backlash of the sort exhibited in the anecdotes above:

- Women have shown improved performance in academic endeavors. However, the success has spurred the creation of denigrating terminology, such as 'educational impostor' (*samozvanka-obrazovanka*) and 'educated proletarian' (*nauchennye rabotnitsy*), that undercuts the value of women scholars and teachers.
- Women's profession organizations appeared spontaneously at the beginning of the 1990s, such as the Center for Gender Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the unions of women mathematicians, and physicists, the Union of Women of Moscow State University. These organizations countered the Soviet Women's Committee of the Soviet period, which had remained inactive.

The androcentric Russian culture responded to these innovations with new jokes aimed at deprecating women's organizational abilities and their sense of solidarity:

> Resolutions carried by the International Women's Congress.
> 1) All women are sisters!
> 2) All men are animals!
> 3) There is nothing to wear ...

The 'double standard,' so common in male-dominated communities, is found in the academic world too. If a woman scientist wants to improve her professional standing she is considered a 'drudge', and if she tries to look attractive in a feminine way, she needs to dispense with the goal of gaining recognition as a scholar. In response to the increase of women's influence in the academic sphere (especially in gender studies), male scholars created the following snide comments, which quickly gained wide circulation:

> Women seem to have a lot of sex until they are 40 years old; and then they prefer 'gender'. (Another version: why are you interested in 'gender'? You are married, aren't you?)

These comments are marked by both sexism and ageism. It is not coincidental that women scholars tend to positions of prominence in their fields after the age of forty. The scientific community, made up mostly of men, treats attractive women scientists as sex objects, as illustrated in the following joke:

> Women biologists drink until they lose their pulse (or, until they become petrified and pass out), women mathematicians drink to infinity, women chemists drink until they have no reaction, women physicists drink until they lose resistance.

> A woman scientist is like an unbroken horse: interesting, but nobody needs one. (A woman physicist is like an unbroken horse: rare, but useless.)

Clearly, in this product of the neo-patriarchal Russian culture, it is only the antithesis of a woman scientist--that is, a woman without any academic credentials--who qualifies as 'useful.' Such a *simple woman* would not care about epistemological ambiguity or the discursive chaos of postmodernism; she is *simpler* and that makes her *more useful*. Other jokes (which I will omit here) contain still more overt sexual connotations, all reflecting a discourse of superiority common in the dominant (male) culture.

Male culture underpins the academic establishment of Russia. Women have been taught their place in it, making themselves useful through their stereotypical devotion to duty, their exceptional capacity for work, their discipline. A typical joke speaks to the dominant conception of women's place in scientific research:

> 'Hey, babe! You've got such long fingers… Do you play the piano?'
> 'No, I wash test tubes in the institute …'

Women's value, then, rests in their diligence rather than in their knowledge or talent. The statistics bear out the manifestation of prejudice: 52% of women employees of academic institutions do not have an academic degree, and 57% of junior research assistants in academic research institutes.

Women are abundant in the lower stratum of scientific research, where their roles mimic those of domestic housewives. It is in service professions – cleaner, cook, teacher, physician, psychotherapist – that women play the major role. Women secure *the rear* for their husbands or chiefs. From the home to the workplace, the notion that women belong in supporting roles prevails, becoming even an obsession within the academic community. This attitude is enunciated overtly at in the semi-private setting of parties after presenting and defending their theses, which often feature toasts of this type:

> It is not only these Atlantes who support the sanctuary of science, but also the caryatids, the wives of scientists, too. The tender arms of these women do not yield to strong male arms, but the scientists' wives take care of their husbands, give them moral support, allow them to immerse themselves in science and free them from external concerns. How would the science advance, if scientists got stuck in household duties? Let's drink to the caryatids of the sanctuary of sciences!
> Promote the advancement of science and your husbands to new frontiers!

It is not accidental that 48% of male scientists have 2 children in the family and 10% even 3 boys or girls; on the other hand the contrary 29% of female scientist and academics have no children (the same proportion have 2 children and only 2% have three). 'Children-oriented' family is now not the goal (and can be only a dream) of women scientists in post-Soviet epoch.

In post-Soviet Russia, many businessmen have wives who are scholars. However, these men treat their wives' achievements as their own property, to be flaunted

whenever an opportunity occurs. When both spouses are scholars in the same field, though, men do not brag about their wives' scholarly accomplishments. In a biographical interview, one woman lamented:

> My scientific achievements did not help me to become happy… We had been married for 17 years when I defended my second dissertation. My husband was in a dismal mood at the party, and the next day he said to me that he had decided to divorce me, because he 'didn't want to be the husband of a Margaret Thatcher.' I burst into tears. But what could be done in such a situation? That was how he showed which of us was the master.

Women who have attained the highest academic degrees do not envy their female coworkers, who gave up academic work and pursuit of the doctorate during *perestroika*, and turned into so-called 'consumption managers' – housewives to 'New Russians.' These wives of businessmen discourage their daughters and granddaughters from intellectual pursuits. Unlike their former coworkers, women academics are preoccupied with the preservation of child-rearing techniques that were widespread from the end of 1950s until the beginning of 1970s, which foster girls' scholarly interests. In the 21st century, they still adhere to the intellectual values their parents taught them. They hold that flexibility in time scheduling, the fulfillment of intellectual work, the opportunities of personal advancement and self-realization, and friendly relationships with other intellectuals will offset the miserable salaries.

The respondents in our interviews recounted stories of obstacles being swept from their paths to scholarly achievement, but in reality demonstrate their moral courage and the success of their coping strategies. At the time of our interview, most respondents tended to romanticize the time when they started their research and had to overcome great difficulties (one of them recalled a German saying *Anfang ist immer schwer*, 'beginning is always hard'). Although most of these women came from academic families (evidence of status replication), no respondent thought that her social origin gave her a better opportunity to start with. Their reticence can best be seen as an attempt to excuse and legitimize their intense study and their ability to achieve on their own and not at their teachers' behest. While telling their stories about 'all the difficulties of youth', women scholars tried to hide the fact that as children of upper-level academics, they had a sort of social launching pad. Instead, they pointed out that they had had no more than equal opportunity with their classmates, and therefore they attributed their success to hard work and self-denial. This biographical narrative is typical of women of the academic elite and it differs from those of women from other social strata, for example, businessmen's wives, who seem to have traded their communal apartments for fashionable seaside villas without the least internal angst. The other difference lies in academic women's disinclination to attribute their success to divine intervention; the scholarly environment tends to promote a certain level of religious skepticism. Businessmen's wives, in contrast, are prone to explain their unexpected wealth by 'It was so ordained…'

Strange as it may seem, women scholars tend to downplay their administrative activity, saying such things as 'I never aspired to power,' and 'I never asked the

administration for a promotion.' In this way, they prefer to emphasize 'other more important factors' in their lives. Among these 'other' factors, the first is the husband, or an academic advisor, department head or director, especially among unmarried women. They took on the role of promoters, as defenders and breadwinners. The American anthropologist Sherry Orthner, who laid the foundations for feminist anthropology, recognized the ideological practice latent in such relationships and coined the term *refusal to act* to describe women's roles.

It is characteristic of academic women to attribute their scholarly achievements (such as the doctoral degree, professorial rank, department head, membership in international organizations to a favorable conjuncture of circumstances and the help of 'other important factors.' None of women respondents admitted that she *had been pressing* for official recognition of her achievements. Quite the contrary; all of them realized that 'they had been placed under artificial constraints, but they did not resist them, waiting for some day in future when somebody would come and offer them a better opportunity.'

Women scholars' biographical narratives of post-soviet period reveal their fears--of losing reliable protection, of being left by husbands, of being unable to cope in such volatile situation. They did not boast of personal achievements, even in the academic sphere. This discourse reflects the impact of the Soviet-era concept of the *working mother*, who was valued not for her success in the professional arena, but rather primarily as a wife who reared her children and earned extra money. A sizable majority (75%) of respondents who had accomplished significant prominence in the academic sphere were not married at the time of our interview. Thus, they had no obvious motive to adopt such a deferential attitude towards marital obligations. But married women scholars tend to value family preservation; sometimes they placed it ahead of their professional achievements.

Women academics' own reluctance to acknowledge constraints might explain why the '*glass ceiling*' continues to obstruct the progress of many women in science? Even though officially it does not exist, an impenetrable barrier remains. At present, women scientists trying to gain official recognition in their scientific communities encounter practically the same obstacles as her sisters thirty years ago. In the registers of second (doctoral) degree holders in Russia, women made up 20% in 2000 (compared with 14% in 1980); associate members of the Russian Academy of Sciences – 15%, academicians – 1.3%. The Presidium of the Supreme Certification Commission that authorizes the approval of resolutions by academic councils is comprised of 26 men and only 1 woman. There is only one woman on the Council of the Russian Foundation for Humanities, which manages the financing of new scholarly projects. In the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, women hold only 1 in 5 of the posts of laboratory heads; only 4% of deputy directors of Departments are women, and only 2% of directors are women. However, few women seem likely to protest against the existing practice: 67% of women scientists who were interviewed (mostly at Academy institutes in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk) believe, that *management,* including in the academic sphere, will remain men's prerogative.

Why don't women scholars object to the inequitable relationship, but instead take it for granted? Despite the low salaries, the women interviewed (from laboratory assistants to institute directors) emphasized that they are satisfied by their work (about 90% of

respondents). This high rate of satisfaction implies that women are interested in pursuing their scholarly work, rather than better salaries, higher positions, or even recognition for their academic achievements. As a professor of musicology said, 'an attractive, honoured profession is worth much in itself'. The texts of the interviews reflect the existence of a very complicated array of relationships between the men and women of scientific (academic) work projects that extend beyond institutional modes of interaction. Official posts and ranks are not of great importance. But an analysis revealed, surprisingly, the significance of behavioral patterns, consistent speech constructions, discursive practices, and the rituals of the workday such as joint tea drinking.

While recounting their everyday lives as scholars, Russian women underline the fact that the heads of their scientific units replicate *familial relationships* in their sectors (departments, chairs etc.), preserving multi-generational structures and a complicated hierarchy under the leadership of an all-knowing head of family. The posts of department heads in postgraduate and doctoral programs in our scientific and research institutes are almost without exception held by women acting as careful *institute mammies*. Just as in the traditional Russian patriarchal family and in the Soviet-era governmental structures, paternalistic relationships pervaded all institutions and the society itself, and *academic families* differ. No matter who the head of a sector is, either a woman or a man, the unit's relationships take a typically patriarchal hierarchical form. The department head never performs the set-up for tea-drinking rituals or washes the cups of colleagues at the end of a working day. Strict hierarchies govern relationships; those people holding higher post are addressed with the polite form of 'you' (except for members of the same research group, persons of the same age, and those people who are accustomed to socializing informally during research expeditions).

The most important component of a scientist's everyday life is still preparation for participation and participation in meetings of academic congresses and other types of academic conventions. Respondents still recall vividly the severe reduction of such meetings that took place 10-15 years ago due to lack of financing. According to their accounts, in that period women scientists, in an attempt to establish networks based in traditional family ties, began to hold meetings 'for insiders.' Through their 'secret,' 'quiet' leadership, women scientists tried to retain women in post-Soviet science, and their efforts may be seen as the real story of the period, although they could not be recognized, unlike the open, and theoretically legitimate and legal governance of men.

On the other hand, the struggle over the past twenty years to obtain grants has been the second important component of everyday life for academics, for both men and women. In accordance with official procedure, project principal investigators must file all applications and prepare all reports. But often higher-ranking academics are named as the principle investigators of projects in order to facilitate the acceptance of the grant applications, women scientists, who generally have lower status, are relegated to 'project manager' positions and routine work. Thus, this aspect of everyday life in scientific communities is marked by gender differences. The following post-soviet joke illustrates the reality: 'Our women are able to perform any work, even the most difficult, but only under the leadership of men'. Few of the male scientists started their careers as secretaries in a scientific area where they had to retype other scholars' articles or answer the telephone. But for most women respondents, this was a typical rung on their career ladder. After a variable period of time, they proceeded to the second stage, that of

writing the doctoral dissertation. Most women scholars described the third stage, preparation for the doctoral defense, as the most difficult. They faced great difficulties when they took the posts of professor, leading scientific researcher and especially chief researcher (or principal scientific officer). Most respondents who decided to write the second dissertation did so in secret, and defended it at an academic institution far away from the ones where they worked. Only a few had the courage to undertake the unequal struggle with administration for promotion, with its concomitant stress and moral and psychological pressure. All the institutes under the Russian Academy of Sciences constrain women's professional advancement, while promoting male colleagues who are inactive and contribute little of scholarly value, but represent no challenge to authority.

When asked the direct question 'At what stages of your scientific career did you experience sex discrimination?' most women respondents pointed to the period before defense of the second dissertation and afterwards, when the administration tried to ignore the defense and made no change in salary or position in light of it. Nearly half of the women interviewed emphasized that their contributions to scholarship were inappropriately devalued, and that their rights to their intellectual property were impaired in the course of publication of their work:

> A chapter of a monograph was based on my manuscripts; however I was not included in the list of authors – since I was only an assistant to the Chair at that time, and then a Candidate of Medical Science. And I walked out, and went to another scientific and research institute…. (doctor)

We encountered numerous stories of this type in our interviews. In writing my reports on this project, I wanted to include the most typical examples of social practices at the highest levels of academic hierarchies that devalued women. Women who hold doctoral degrees suffer practically the same indignities and discrimination as women who are junior research assistants and senior researchers. But I did not intend to dwell upon the topic of latent gender discrimination as recorded in the folklore of the academic profession and in women's biographic stories; most of the respondents did not want to focus on these forms of discrimination, and they preferred to explain their situations as unrelated to gender:

> I would not term it gender discrimination; it is most likely just a matter of personal social capabilities, what might be called social competence, and the ability to build relations with the right people. It is a problem of a talent to survival in an academic world, rather than gender imbalance. Talented people always face difficulties, and in this situation it is talent that suffers such restrictions (and not being a woman). Forget your gender ...

Migration to the West after the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Would you do it again?

Galina Denisova, German Mendzheritskiy, Ekaterina Bagreeva

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union when the quality of life deteriorated sharply, many people chose to migrate to Western countries such as Germany and Norway. However, a large number of people also decided to migrate within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Today, with 20 years of belated wisdom, the question is; was the decision to migrate the right one, and would one do it again?

This and other questions were the topics of the research project 'General and special features of the adaptation of Russian-speaking immigrants: comparative analysis of the processes in Russia, Germany and Norway', which was conducted in 2008 and 2009. This comparative study was based on a task-oriented questionnaire, as well as in-depth interviews. The pilot study covered three federal states of Germany, three federal regions of Russia, and the city of Oslo in Norway, with 190 respondents in Germany, 150 respondent in Russia and 62 respondents in Norway.

Different factors affecting the decision to migrate to each of the specified destinations were analysed. Because of 'pull' factors, it is traditionally supposed that, for migrants from the former Soviet Union, the West is a more attractive destination than a new location within the former Soviet Union. Thus, migrants to Germany and Norway ought to be more content with their decision than migrants who moved within Russia. However, the results of the research point to another 'truth': migration to the West was not necessarily the best solution for the migrants. An analysis of 'push' and 'pull' factors, as well as objective and subjective aspects of life quality can illuminate this question. This paper provides some empirical evidence for the latter.

Background

Changes in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as implemented by Mikhail Gorbachev were among the main reasons for the start of international mass migration. The later collapse of the USSR further intensified the growth of emigration which was observed from the second half of the 1980s. Between 1981 and 1986, 44,000 people emigrated from the Soviet Union. During the next few years, these numbers rose sharply, with 28,000 people leaving the USSR in 1988, 204,000 in 1989, and 413,000 in 1990.

Between 1987 and 1990, the emigrants mainly represented three ethnic groups - Jews, Germans, and Greeks, who accounted for 97% of all emigrants.[1] The ethnic composition was to a large degree determined by the immigration policy of potential host countries. Israel, Germany, and Greece, in particular, openly indicated a preference for a migrants belonging to specific ethnic groups, as their national immigration policies were

[1] Mukomel V.I., *Migrazionnaia politika Rossii: postsovetskie kontekste*, Moscow, 2005, pp.13-15

aimed at gathering compatriots from different countries. In addition, Germany, along with the United States, assists the migration of Jews following the genocide of this ethnic group during the Second World War. Therefore, it is not surprising that the major flows of emigrants were directed to Germany (60%), Israel (20%), and USA (10%).

However, over the past two decades the ethnic composition of Russian emigration has changed. In the mid-1990s Germans still made up almost half of the emigrants from Russia, with about 10% of these migrants being Jews. In the early 2000s, the proportion of ethnic Germans and Jews dropped about 1.5 times, while that of Russian immigrants to Germany increased correspondingly.[2]As the resources of these ethnic groups in Russia diminished, the relative flow of migrants with this background was also reduced, even though the total number of emigrants increased. Consequently, the share of migrants with an ethnic Russian background reached 40% of all migrants between 2001 and 2004. Problems with personal security and economic stability in the 1990s and early 2000s also resulted in increased migration of members of other ethnic groups from Russia and other CIS countries.[3]At the same time, the number of people leaving Russia for destinations beyond the CIS was relatively small in comparison with the total migration. countries. Israel, Germany, and Greece, in particular, openly indicated a preference for Table 1 details the migration from Russia to other CIS countries between 1989 and 2000.

Table 1: Migration from Russia to other CIS countries, 1989-2000[4]

Year	Number	Share of total migration (%)
1989	47,600	6.4
1990	103,700	14.2
1991	88,400	14.2
1992	103,100	23.6
1993	111,900	32.6
1994	113,900	32.9
1995	118,000	32.9
1996	100,200	34.4
1997	83,500	35.9
1998	80,300	37.7
1999	85,300	39.7
2000	62,200	42.8

[2] Metelev S.E. *Mezdunarodnaia trudovaia migrazia i nelegalnaia migrazia v Rossii,* Moscow, 2006, p 57, 59-60; Zaionchkovskaja Z.A. 'Emigrazia v dalnee zarubezie', *Mir Rossii*, XII, 2, 2003, p.148.

[3] The Global Commission on International Migration*, Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action Report of the Global Commission on International Migration*, 2005.

[4] Source: Ribakovski L.L., Riazanzev S.V. 'Fenomenologia devograficheskogo prozessa i ee osobennosti v Rossii', *Gosudarstvennaia politika vivoda Rossii iz demograficheskogo krizisa* Moscow, 2007, pp.157-158

Since 2001, emigration from Russia to the countries of 'traditional destination' has averaged about 50,000 people annually, which is about half of the total flow of migrants.[5] International migration from Russia stands at about 1.2 million emigrants for the period from 1989-2004.[6] Comparing these figures with those for other CIS countries, the Global Commission on International Migration found that the flow of emigrants from Ukraine is about 1 million, despite the fact that Ukraine's population is almost three times less than the population of Russia. For a comparatively small country such as Moldova, the international migration figure is 400,000 emigrants.[7]

Since 2000, migration from Russia has decreased significantly. At the same time, the range of destination countries expanded from traditional countries such as USA, Germany, and Israel, to countries such as Canada, Finland, Spain, and, to a lesser degree, to Australia, Norway, Portugal, France, Czech, and Sweden. In the context of expanding destinations, questions arise related to the age structure and motivation of the migrating population. The previously dominant flows of migrant – Jews, Greeks and ethnic Germans – represented all age groups, while people of working age, children and adolescents now mainly constitute the migrant population. Most current migrants are knowledge workers, and work and marriage now constitute the main reasons for emigration from Russia, while the migrants' goal is to achieve permanent residence in the destination country.

In parallel with the development of migration, the political elite and the Russian government came to realise the need to assume an active position in the international labour market. Russia, like other modern countries, is concerned with the need to attract foreign workers. This situation increases the interest in issues of successful adaptation of Russian migrants, and factors impacting on their effective integration into European countries.[8]

---

[5] Ribakovski L.L., Riazanzev S.V. 'Fenomenologia devograficheskogo prozessa i ee osobennosti v Rossii', *Gosudarstvennaia politika vivoda Rossii iz demograficheskogo krizisa* Moscow, 2007.

[6] Ibid pp.157-158

[7] The Global Commission on International Migration*, Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action Report of the Global Commission on International Migration*, 2005.

[8] For the purpose of this paper, we distinguish between the concepts of 'adaptation' and 'integration'. Under 'adaptation' we understand the process of active 'acclimatisation' of the individual to a new social environment by mastering the language of the host society, its behavioural norms and established rules, familiarity with the history and culture of the country. Adaptation also involves mastering the labour market in the new place of living, which could include learning a new profession, settling down, etc. The optimal result of the adaptation process is the integration of a migrant into the host society. Thus, by 'integration' we mean the subjective involvement of a migrant in the interests and social goals, and his/her inclusion in the social networks, of the host society. Indicators of a migrant's integration into the host society could be, for example, participation in institutions, such as trade unions, voluntary organisations, sports associations, different foundations and so on, which are not based on an ethnic or emigration background. Integration does not need to be accompanied by the loss of the migrant's own cultural identity. However, the subjective perception of one's integration into the host society is realised by a person through the psychological harmonization with the external social

The study

The figures on the increasing numbers of migrants presented above may be interpreted as an indirect indicator of a positive prognosis for the integration and successful adaptation of migrants in their new countries of living. It may also be assumed that in the global communication and social networking society, information about the level of satisfaction of migrants with their new circumstances is spreading among their relatives and friends in both host and home countries.

In line with these ideas, the present study investigates the degree of integration of Russian-speaking migrants into European countries over the last two decades, as part of the research project: 'Comparative analysis of the adaptation strategies of Russian-speaking migrants in Russia, Germany and Norway' (2008-2010).

We designated Russian-speaking migrants, rather than ethnic Russian migrants, as the object of investigation, as the vast majority of migrants from Russia and former Soviet republics, regardless of ethnicity, were socialized in common Soviet institutions where the Russian language plays an important role as a mechanism of integration. Thus, the participants carry a socio-cultural characteristic common for the Soviet political community.

The host countries Germany, Norway and Russia were chosen, since they belong to a group of European countries with similar climatic conditions, and a comparable level of socio-economic development. At the same time, these countries implement different migration policies, thereby creating diverging conditions for the integration of immigrants. These facts allow us to determine the influence of migration policies on the adaptation and integration of migrants in different, but comparable countries.

Integration is intuitively understood as a long-term individual project, which aims at the creation of favourable socio-economic conditions (the initial pull-factor) and requires a friendly, open psychological climate, not only on the part of state institutions, such as schools, language schools, social services, but also the institutions of civil society. These institutions are relevant for forming and supporting a personal European cultural identity on the one hand; they can also compensate for a lack of friendly informal contacts on the other. For migrants from the former Soviet Union this friendly informal environment of interaction with an accepting society is a necessary condition for integration.

The integration criteria studied relate to different aspect of life perception of the migrants with self-oriented (goals and emotions) and other-oriented (contacts with the host population) dimensions. They include, for example, migrants' attitudes towards their place of residence, their perceptions of 'home', attitudes towards the ethnic characteristics of their neighbours, the level of satisfaction with the legal status achieved by the migrants, their attitudes towards migrants from the host community, the life perspectives for their children in a particular country, as well as their willingness to accept the new place of settlement as one's homeland.

---

environment, which is manifested in the formation of new components in the individual identity, his/her identification with the surrounding social environment, the formation of 'We-identity'.

A pilot study deploying a standardized interview was conducted in three regions of Russia (150 respondents), three in Germany (190 respondents) and one in Norway (Oslo; 62 respondents). Additionally, a series of in-depth expert interviews with representatives of public organizations that help migrants in adapting was carried out.

The standardized interview discussed several groups of questions: a) preparation for migration (motives, attitudes, and projected outcomes), b) adaptation strategies, c) outcomes and their agreement with migrants' plans, and d) assessment of the achieved level of integration in the new community. Here, we report findings from groups c) and d).

The analysis of the data shows that the migrants in the three countries differed in the degree to which they considered their migration a positive development. Although more than half of the respondents in all three countries (63.4% in Norway; 60.7% Russia and 53% Germany) acknowledged that 'moving to a new location has had a positive impact on them and their families', the most positive evaluation was given by 45% of the respondents in Norway, 22.7% in Russia, and just 17.1% in Germany. The number of migrants giving an 'undecided' answer to this question differed similarly (15% in Norway, 20% in Russia, and 22.7% in Germany).

In migration, people set certain goals for themselves. The degree of satisfaction with the outcomes of these goals again differs significantly among the migrants in Germany, Norway and Russia. While nearly half of all migrants in all three countries felt that they had reached their goals, a sizeable group of respondents answered this question negatively. In particular, 41.1% of the migrants in Germany and 36% of those in Russia believe they failed to achieve their goals. In Norway, only 17.8% of the participants answered in that way. When considering these results, it is necessary to remember that most immigrants were satisfied, even though they may have revised their initial goals during the process of integration.

Perceptions of one's success are closely related to one's financial situation. Again, there are considerable differences in the responses of migrants from different countries. More than half of the respondents in Norway (52.5%) stated that they were 'living well without any material problems', while far fewer of the respondents in Germany and Russia (both 18%) answered in this way. The majority of respondents in Germany (52.4%) and Russia (58.5%) rated their financial situation as 'more or less acceptable', compared to 36.1% in Norway. 29.9% of respondents in Germany, 22.4% in Russia and 11.5% in Norway answered that they 'live very modestly'.

A further criterion for evaluating migrants' integration into the host society is the perceived attitudes of the local population towards migrants. The majority of respondents in Norway (60.7%) and Russia (64.9%) believe that 'they are considered one of the local population' while in Germany, only a third (35.5%) of the respondents answered in the same way, and more than half (52.2%) considered themselves to be strangers. Every fifth respondent in Norway (20%) and one in ten in Germany and Russia (10% each) were unable to give a definitive answer to this question.

Society's attitude towards migrants is particularly evident in relation to children, and may be looked upon as an indicator for the children's life perspectives in the new country. Therefore, it is important how parents assess the microclimate in schools. Indeed, on the basis of this criterion, the majority of the participants in Germany (77%), Norway (89.8%) and Russia (78.4%) believe that their children have good perspectives

for the future and are not faced with prejudice in the education system in the country of residence.

Yet another important criterion for evaluating the level of successful integration into the new community is achieving or finding a new identity. This issue was approached through a series of questions identifying differences in the emotions related to the 'home' country and the feeling of 'being at home'. Both of these feelings are platforms for forming a new civic identity. Their coincidence or mismatch depends not only on the subjective characteristics of the immigrant, but also to a large extent on the migration policies of the state, which may be oriented on a civil-juridical or ethno-cultural basis.

The data show that the majority of migrants from the former Soviet Union perceive their homeland from a historical perspective: it is the place where a person was born and raised (78% in Norway, 66.7% in Germany and 57.8% in Russia). Along with them, 10% of migrants in Germany and Norway and 20% of those in Russia associate the home county with the place 'where the ancestors are and where one's historical roots lay'. Only a small group of the migrants, on average 9% in each country, associate the 'home country' with the place of current residence.

However, in the minds of Russian migrants the notion of homeland or home country is complementarily connected with the feeling of being at home, which is geographically associated with either the host country or the country of origin. Thus, the majority of migrants in Norway (76.3%), Germany (68.9%) and Russia (61.2%) consider 'home' to be 'a place where I live now', while for every tenth in Norway and Germany, and one in five in Russia, it is 'the place where I was born and raised'. Further, about 15% of respondents in Germany and Russia, and 8.5% of the respondents in Norway call home 'the place where most of one's family lives'.

A direct control question, 'Do you feel at home here?', was asked in order to verify the replies. More than half of the respondents in each sample gave a positive answer to this question (74.7% in Norway, 59.7% in Russia, and53.6% in Germany). Every tenth respondent in Norway and Russia and almost one in five in Germany expressed uncertainty when answering this question.

The high adaptation rate of Russian-speaking migrants from countries of the former Soviet Union is also confirmed by the final evaluations. More than half of the migrants in Germany (53.6%) and Norway (61.7%), and slightly less in Russia (48.6%), reported that they live 'where they want to live', and that they 'live well' (83.1% in Norway, 66% in Russia and 62.4% in Germany). It may well be that migrants who moved within Russia have yet to complete their migration history, as 37.3% of these respondents are not satisfied with their new place of residence.

Finally, when considering the core question of 'if I had to start all over again, would I have moved here again?', 64.5% of immigrants in Norway, 54.9% in Germany and 46.6% in Russia gave a positive answer. Nevertheless, a considerable number of respondents was unable to give an unambiguous answer to this question (39% in Germany, 27.4% in Norway, 47.3% in Russia).

In conclusion, Russian-speaking migrants are predominantly satisfied with their decision to move and feel integrated enough in the host society. Not only are their goals realised and is their interaction with the host society effective but they also perceive themselves at home and would migrate again if they had this opportunity. Among the

investigated self-oriented and other-oriented dimensions of adaptation the most significant for the migrants were positive expectations concerning the future of their children and their personally feeling at home in host country.

The Social Transformation of Former Closed Cities in Estonia

Darima Batorova

Between 1989 and 1991, Russia and other post-Soviet countries revealed the existence of nuclear closed cities beyond the borders of modern Russia. In 1990, Russia passed the legal act 'Cities and territories of the RSFSR with a special regime' (19.10.1990)[1], through which two of these cities, Paldiski and Sillamäe, located in Estonia (on the coast west of Tallin and Narva respectively) became known.

These closed cities were the result of the Soviet occupation of Estonia that began in 1940. Compared to other states in the region, Estonia was one of the most militarized territories. Soviet military facilities occupied 1.97% of the total area of the country.[2] While Paldiski was a Soviet naval base with two nuclear reactors containing an educational training center,[3] Sillamäe contained a uranium enrichment plant and the largest radioactive waste repository in Central Europe.[4] Paldiski was a military town, and Sillamäe a civilian one; however, both contained a civilian population. Because of their nuclear association, Paldiski and Sillamäe were closed off to the rest of society for around 40 years with an access control system. For the entire Soviet era, these cities were taken out of the urban system of the Republic of Estonia and shared no relations with them. The Soviet Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Ministry of directly managed them Industry without the participation of the Estonian government. The cities were isolated from the rest of society through a special regime of strict surveillance and protection.

In exchange for isolation the population was afforded a high standard of living and a number of benefits: high wages, no deficit, better services, and the expedient provision of housing and cars. The collapse of the Soviet Union along with the sharp reduction in government subsidies and production brought an end to the protected existence of the residents of Sillamäe and Paldiski. It also caused Estonia to add nuclear security to its agenda.

This paper studies the social transformation of former closed post-communist cities towards democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union based on a comparative case study of Sillamäe and Paldiski from 1991 to 2008. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the civilian part of the population had the right to stay in Estonia. The

---

[1] ХУДЯКОВА, И., Территория закрытого типа и ее виды. *Российский юридический журнал*. 2005, 4, pp.106-110.

[2] Compare these figures with those for Latvia (1.68%), Lithuania (1.43%), Hungary (0.52%), the Czech Republic (0.44%) and Poland (0.23%). Cunningham, K. Base Closure and Redevelopment in Central and Eastern Europe. July 1997. Bonn International Center for Conversion. p. 10

[3] SANTANA, Rebecca. Home on the abandoned military base. *The Baltic Times*. Oct 29-Nov 4, 1998, p. 20.

[4] Maremae, Ello and Tankler, Hain. *Historical Survey of Nuclear Proliferation in Estonia, 1945-1995*. Tartu: Tartu University, 2003, p.14.

transformation process of these closed cities differs in complexity from the transformation process of regular post-communist cities. The differences are due to the following factors: Sillimäe and Paldiski's closed method of operations; a single ethnic (Russian) population, viewed in the Estonian society as 'the occupiers'; a limited economic system based on a single military industry; forced migration of military personnel; lack of historical, commercial and cultural ties with other Estonian cities; a weak local government; and severe ecological problems.[5]

It is important to analyze and understand the way these two cities were transformed after Estonia proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, because there are still 43 closed cities in Russia and a few more in other post-soviet Republics.[6] Research into the transformation of these cities has focused on two main aspects: demilitarization combined with the creation of enterprises, and the socioeconomic transformation of the population. Demilitarization entails the processes of reorienting the economy, changing the functions of the city, and implementing environmental remediation. In relation to the socioeconomic transformation, the possibility of social mobility for Sillamäe's and Paldiski's residents, as a result of their coming to be seen as the 'occupiers', i.e. part of the lower class of Estonia as opposed to the closed upper class they belonged to during the Soviet Union, has been studied. A question for further research is how closed cities can possibly remain closed as the reach of globalization to remote parts of the world continuously increases.

Historical context

During the 1940s and 1950s, in order to reach parity with the USA in the arms race, the USSR established closed nuclear cities. After World War II, technological advances and the Cold War brought about changes in the urban development of the USSR. Closed military and scientific cities where military production was completely separated from civilians emerged as a result (ZATO: 'закрытый автономный территориальный округ', 'closed administrative territorial entities'). These include cantonments (Leninsk, Snerzhinsk and Paldiski),[7] industrial nuclear research cities (Dubna and Kurchatov) and industrial atomic cities (Sillamäe). Since ZATOs were officially only defined after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the terms ZATO and 'cantonment' are sometimes used interchangeably. A cantonment is a complex of buildings to house soldiers, workers, and employees of the military. A ZATO is a territorial entity with a local government, which contains industrial companies, military personnel, and other entities with established

[5] By 1993, 23 accidents involving radioactive material had occurred in former Soviet closed cities. ЛАППО, Г.; ПОЛЯН, П. Закрытые города. *Социологические исследования*, 1998, 2, pp. 43-48.

[6] ЛИСАВКИН, Г. Зачем ЗАТО муниципальное чуть-чуть? Российская Федерация сегодня. 2010, №7. http://www.russia-today.ru/mestnay-vlast/398-zachem-zato-municipalnoe-chut-chut.html

[7] ФАТЕЕВ, К. О статусе военных городков. *Военно-правовое обозрение*. 2001, 2. http://www.voenprav.ru/doc-25-1.htm

Table 1. Concealment levels of closed cities in the USSR[8]

Level of concealment	Characteristics	Examples
Secret city	Concealed from the world and not found on maps	Seversk (Russia); Stepnogorosk (Kazakhstan)
Totally closed city	Russian citizens not from these cities were not allowed to enter; access control systems and 'sanitary zones' were established around the city; the residents of such cities had to pass security clearance	Sillamäe (Estonia); Paldiski (Estonia); Severomorsk (Russia)
City closed to foreigners	Foreigners were not allowed to enter these cities	Tartu at night (Estonia); Murmansk (Russia); Gorky (Russia)

special conditions for safe operations and the effective safeguarding of state secrets, among them a person's residence in these entities. The industrial companies developed, manufactured, stored, and disposed of weapons of mass destruction and recycled radioactive and other materials.[9]

The closure of cities to the outside world was intended to ensure public safety as well as to comply with international obligations by keeping secret their information about nuclear programs and weapons.[10] Therefore, almost all the nuclear cities and some military bases that housed nuclear facilities in the USSR were given 'closed city' status. An important feature of Soviet closed cities was that the scientific and military companies performed not only their specific tasks but were in charge of social services. Military factories were responsible for the construction of social institutions such as schools, hospitals, and preschools. The factories were responsible for virtually all affairs concerning the community. In essence, the management of the company was also the city's administration, even when it existed separately.

The study of the social life in former Soviet ZATOs is a new area of research, which to investigate only became possible after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So far few cities have undergone the transition from 'closed' to 'open' status. In the 43 ZATOs

[8] Based on Gentle, M., 'Former Closed Cities and Urbanisation in FSU: an Exploration in Kazakhstan', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2004, pp. 263-265.

[9] Закон Росссийской Федерациии от 14 июля 1992 г. N 3297-1 'О закрытом административно-территориальном образовании' (с изменениями от 28 ноября 1996 г., 31 июля 1998 г., 2 апреля, 31 декабря 1999 г., 30 декабря 2001 г., 24 декабря 2002 г.) http://base.garant.ru/10108046.htm

[10] Постановление Правительства Российской Федерации № 655 от 26 июня 1998 года 'Об обеспечении особого режима в закрытом административно-территориальном образовании, на территории которого расположены объекты Министерства обороны Российской Федерации'.h ttp://pravo.levonevsky.org/bazaru09/postanov/sbor07/text07190.htm

located in Russia sociological research is impossible due to their closed status. Consequently, no comprehensive analysis of this form of social transformation has been published.

Problems for researching the social transformation of Paldiski and Sillamäe consist in inaccessible statistical data as well as a lack of monographs and scholarly articles on the development of the cities from 1945 to the present. So far, scientific interest in the former nuclear cities has solely concerned itself with the severe environmental problems they face. In relation to the availability of data, unfortunately, copies of historical documents prior to 1991 of these closed cities were not kept in Estonia but taken away by Russian soldiers during the Soviet collapse. Therefore, statistical data for these two cities is only available from 1991. However, in the public database of the Department of Statistics in Estonia all statistics regarding the development of small towns from 1990 to 2000 is missing. The statistical data for the current research were obtained from local authorities in both cities or through interviews with local officials: with the Mayor of Paldiski, the Deputy Mayor of Sillamäe, with local historians and activists.

Paths of transformation

With the collapse of the USSR, the war industry began to experience financial problems that directly affected the social life of the closed cities. Companies went bankrupt, and many cities remained virtually without management and finances. There were several options for development after 1991. Transition options include a) securing a full state subsidy, b) privatization, c) suburbanization, d) deurbanization and, finally, e) retention of the military facilities for use by the governments of the new post-Soviet states, each with their own pros and cons. Which option would Paldiski and Sillamäe favour?

Scenario a), the granting of a full state subsidy, could not be realised in either Paldiski or Sillamäe due to the prevalent negative mood of the Estonian society towards them. Scenario b), privatization, involves the participation of investors who were looking for cities with important industries or ones that mined and processed minerals. Sillamäe found this route due to its industries and its highly educated personnel. The uranium enrichment plant in Sillamäe was privatized in 1997. This was similar to the fate of a former military town, Skrunda-1, located in Latvia. That town contained 70 buildings including dormitories, day care centres, parking garages, and small factories.[11] The initial lot price for the whole former military town was 220,000 Euros; it finally sold in 2010 for 2.12 million Euros.[12]

Scenario c), suburbanization, became Paldiski's route; however, it was not truly successful. Instead of a suburbanized area it became a 'dormitory town'. In 2007, 800 of the 4,000 residents of Paldiski worked in Tallinn, which is located one hour away by

[11] В Латвии продают город-призрак. *Вести*. 15 декабря 2009.

[12] Бывший советский военный городок в Латвии превратят в свинарник. *Комсомольская правда*, 8.02.2010

car.[13] They only return to Paldiski to sleep at night making it almost a ghost town during the day. Such 'dormitory towns' have poor social infrastructure and a lack of jobs, and they do not really develop. Another example of this scenario is the Czech city Milovice, which was a Soviet military town until 1991. In 2009, Milovice was recorded as the city with the highest unemployment (17%) in the Nymburk district. According to Czech analysts, this was due to the large and rapid resettlement of people to this ex-military city where there were extremely cheap apartments but no jobs.[14]

Scenario d), deurbanization, occurred with some cities in remote areas, for example, a Soviet military base called Suurpea in northern Estonia and an East German city called Wünsdorf. Wünsdorf was the largest Soviet military city and originally had around 40,000 inhabitants; by 1996 there were only 80 inhabitants.[15] But there is one successful example of this model. The Naissaare Island was an isolated Soviet military base in Estonia. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops the territory of this island was proclaimed a protected nature reserve. Today the ruins of the base and local military railway are used as a tourist attraction.[16]

Some of the most successful transitions from cantonments to a civilian community were the ones in which the cantonment was located and closed within an already established city. In other words, a piece of the city was isolated from the rest becoming a cantonment, such as was the case in Legnica and Svinounystse (Poland), and in Liepaja (Latvia). It is important to note that such cantonments were often located in the part of the city that contained its historical buildings in the city centre (e.g. in Legnica and Liepaja). Since the city surrounded the cantonment, it quickly consumed it once the Soviets left, resulting in a successful transition of the former cantonment.

The final scenario e), maintaining the cantonments for Estonian military purposes, was an option for both Paldiski and Sillamäe. 750 military facilities and installments were located in Estonia, occupying a total area of 87,000 hectares.[17] In January 1992, the Estonian army consisted of 85 people, in 1996 the number of military

---

[13] Kurme, M., Chilingarian, N. and Viljassar, R. *4 Scenarios for Paldiski. Creating Stories About the Future*. Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Arts, 2007.

[14] Koinek, P. *Zpráva o situaci na trhu práce za rok 2009*. Nymburk: Úrad práce v Nymburku, 2010, p. 22. www.portal.mpsv.cz/sz/local/nb_info/sz/zpravy/nbokres1209.doc

[15] *Conversion Handbook for the Baltic Sea Region*. INTERREG III B Project Development of a Conversion Network in the Baltic Sea Region – Convernet. February 2006, pp.14-15. http://www.conver.net/pdf/results/cvn_hb_2a_34_72.pdf

[16] Cunningham, K. *Base Closure and Redevelopment in Central and Eastern Europe*. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, July 1997. Report, no 11, p.69.

[17] *Profiles of Post-Soviet Military Residental Areas in Selected Regions* (Baltic Sea Region). Riga: Program of EU, 'Sustainable Reintegration of post-soviet military residential areas as a challenge and opportunity for regional development', 2007, Research 1. 75. www.remido.lv/?dir=eng/11/

personnel increased to 4,528 people.[18] Nevertheless, the Estonian Ministry of Defense decided to use for its military purposes just forty facilities.[19]

The phenomenon of non-citizens in Paldiski and Sillamäe

The Estonian authorities were first allowed to govern Sillamäe in 1991, and Paldiski in 1994. By September 1995 Russia had withdrawn its troops and removed its nuclear technology and fuel. Within two or three years these elite cities became what local journalists call 'incomplete cities with incomplete citizens'.[20] Around 24,000 Russian civilians were left in these cities after the withdrawal of the troops.

The Estonian law on aliens was implemented in 1993. This divided the Russian-speaking people into those who were perceived to have merit for obtaining Estonian citizenship, and those whose residency in Estonia was not welcomed, such as criminals, former Soviet soldiers and their families.[21] That law provoked a diplomatic conflict between Russia and Estonia. Russia threatened that it will stop gas supply to Estonia.[22] In 1994 Boris Yeltsin and Lennart Meri signed an agreement, thanks to which 10,500 military retirees and about 30,000 of their family members were given permanent residency in Estonia.[23] However, former Soviet soldiers and their spouses did not have the right to apply for naturalization in Estonia.[24] Instead of citizenship, they received a special identification document called an 'alien's' or 'non-citizen passport'.

The alien status limits the political and economic rights of these 'non-citizens'.[25] They are not allowed to hold any political position, have no voting rights, expect in local elections, and are not able to hold membership in any political party. In addition, there

---

[18] *Fact Sheet Estonia in 1991-1999*. Tallinn: Estonian Institute, 1999. http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/factsheets_uus_kuju/estonia_1991_1999.htm

[19] Schafer, K. *International Experience and Expertise in Registration Investigation, Assessment, and Clean-Up of Contaminated Military Sites*. Berlin : Federal Environmental Agency of Germany, May 1997. http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/boden-und-altlasten/altlast/web1/berichte/mooreeng/dmeng.htm

[20] 'полугорода с полугражданами'. БАЛЕВА, Регина. Палдиски – полугород с полугражданами. *Вечерние вести*. 4 декабря 1994, p.7.

[21] Poleshchuk Vadim. *Non-Citizens in Estonia*. Tallinn: Legal Information Center for Human Rights, 2004, p.11.

[22] Dančák, B. *Pobaltí v transformaci. Politický vývoj Estonska, Litvy a Lotyšska*. Brno: Masarykova Univerzita v Brno, 1999, pp. 60-61.

[23] Стенограмма заседания Государственной Думы Российской Федерации от 21.07.1995. *Бюллютень 'Государственная Дума. Стенограмма заседаний'*. 1995, no 122, pp.11-14.

[24] Jarve, P. *EUDO Citezenship Observatory. Country Report: Estonia*. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. April 2010. p.15, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Estonia.pdf

[25] О некоторых различиях в правах жителей Эстонской Республики, закрепленных в правовых актах на 1 сентября 2009 года. Таллинн: *Центр по правам человека*, 2009. http://www.lichr.ee/main/diferences/

are a number of professions that can only be held by people with Estonian citizenship, for example the position of the Chief of the security service.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, there were few people in Paldiski who had voting rights. The Estonian government decided to deprive Paldiski of the status of city, but city rights were returned to Paldiski in late 1996, after the implementation of new edition of the law, which allowed all residents to participate in local elections.

Due to their status as 'non-citizens' and their lack of proficiency in the Estonian language, most of the residents of former closed cities were not equipped to enter the labor market. In order to obtain Estonian citizenship, Russians had to prove basic proficiency in the Estonian language and knowledge of the constitution, but learning a new language was difficult for the Russians left in Paldiski and Sillamäe, because they still formed the majority of the cities' population and did not need to use Estonian in their normal life. In Paldiski and Sillamäe, the percentage of non-Estonians in 2008 was 76% and 96% respectively.[26] Around 80% of the unemployed in Sillamäe do not speak Estonian.[27] Estonian is the official language in just one preschool among five and in one secondary school among four.[28] The same situation holds in Paldiski. However, in the last decade the number of people throughout Estonia who are applying for Estonian citizenship is increasing (see Appendix 1).

According to a UN report on human development in Estonia, during the last few years the standard of living of non-Estonians has fallen in comparison to

Table 2. Average Annual Net Income in Estonian Crowns[29]

	2003			2005			2007		
		Estonian citizens	Other citizens		Estonian citizens	Other citizens		Estonian citizens	Other citizens
Estonians	54,285	54,376		71,299	71,317		103,872	103,905	
Non-Estonians	43,271	47,091	41,907	61,131	64,999	57,555	87,798	94,130	81,440

[26] Interview with T. Kalberg Deputy Mayor of Sillamäe. November, 2008.

[27] Программа развития города Силламяэ, 2009-2017. Принята постановлением Силламяэского Городского собрания №131 от 24 сентября 2009. p..10. http://www.Sillamäe.ee/public/files/arengukava%202009-2017,%20vene.pdf?PHPSESSID=484e8d197beff62a6ee5b867ff81cfe8

[28] Программа развития города Силламяэ, 2009-2017. Принята постановлением Силламяэского Городского собрания №131 от 24 сентября 2009, p.20. http://www.Sillamäe.ee/public/files/arengukava%202009-2017,%20vene.pdf?PHPSESSID=484e8d197beff62a6ee5b867ff81cfe8 [цит. 2010-01-05].

[29] Public database of Estonian Department of Statistics. www.pub.stat.ee

Estonians.[30] This was determined on the basis of unequal incomes and the limited opportunities in the labor market for non-Estonians. Non-Estonians receive the lowest income in Estonia. The income gap between non-Estonians and Estonians in a 2007 study was over 20,000 crowns per year (see Table 2). The unemployment rate among the non-Estonian population is traditionally high reaching 19% in 2009. Moreover, the percentage of those able to work among non-Estonians and Estonians is the same (see Appendix 2).

Case study 1: Sillamäe

Paldiski and Sillamäe represent a relatively new wave of cities built by the Soviet administration in Estonia. In 1946, Gulag prisoners began to build a plant for processing uranium in the war-torn village of Sillamäe.[31] It is known that in the early 1950s there was a plan to build a giant city named Slantsgorod connecting Kivioli and Narva, but after Stalin's death this plan was abandoned.[32]

In 1947, around 10,000 prisoners worked on the construction of the Sillamäe factory and the city itself. Judging by the total number of Gulag prisoners in Estonia (40,000), it appears that Sillamäe was a project of high priority.[33] The construction process was strictly classified, and Sillamäe was called 'Mailbox 17', 'Plant № 7', 'Mailbox 22', 'Moscow-400', 'Leningrad-1' at various times during its construction. After the completion of the city, the Gulag prisoners were expelled in 1955.[34] Already during the construction of Sillamäe, civilians began to live and work for the government there. The majority of the residents of the new city were talented young people with good academic records, pro-communists, government trusted, and usually single, recruited from the central part of Russia.[35]

Sillamäe received city status and its name in 1957. It was a new type of town built according to contemporary ideas of scientific and technological progress. Such nuclear industrial cities were called 'children of the Kurchatov Laboratory No.2'.[36] These cities were built to distinct high-end architectural designs, including quality apartments, landscaped recreation areas, and developed public services, for their residents.[37] The core of Sillamäe's architecture in the city centre is in the style of Stalinist neo-classicism and is now protected by the Republic of Estonia. Nuclear cities such as Sillamäe concentrated

[30] Vetik, R. (ed.). *Estonian Human Development Report*. Tallinn : Eesti Koostoo Kogu, 2008, p. 53-54.
[31] ИППОЛИТОВ, А. ГУЛАГ в Силламяэ. *Вестник Силламяэ*. №6, декабрь 1999.
[32] MAREMAE, Ello.; TANKLER, Hain. *Historical Survey of Nuclear Profiliration in Estonia, 1945-1995*. Tartu :Tartu University, 2003, p. 15.
[33] MAREMAE, Ello.; TANKLER, Hain. *Historical Survey of Nuclear Profiliration in Estonia, 1945-1995*. Tartu :Tartu University, 2003, стр. 15.
[34] Interview with A. Popolitov, historian at the Museum of Sillamäe. November 2008.
[35] Interview with A. Popolitov, historian at the Museum of Sillamäe. November 2008.
[36] ЛАППО, М.; ПОЛЯН, П. Закрытые города. *Социологические исследования*. 1998, №2, p. 43-48.
[37] ЛАППО, М. Наукограды России: вчерашние запретные и полузапретные города, сегодняшние точки роста. *Мир России*. 2008, №1, p.29.

Table 3. Population of Sillamäe, 1989-2010[38]

Year	Population	Estonian citizens	Russian citizens	Non citizens
1989	20,561	Closed city		
1990	20,923			
2000	17,232	3,663	3,995	No data
2001	17,140	3,495	4,497	9,602
2002	17,011	3,516	4,604	9,303
2007	16,491	5,177	5,929	4,973
2008	16,392	5,269	6,031	4,558
2009	16,282	5,294	6,445	3,944

the unique scientific and technical potential of the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sillamäe was the city containing the highest percentage of residents with higher education in Estonia.[39]

Between 1948 and 1989, 1,354 tons of enriched uranium were produced in Sillamäe; in 1978 the factory started producing niobium. In 1990 it was revealed that Sillamäe contained one of the world's largest repositories of chemical waste. The area of Sillamäe's tank waste was 33,000m². It contained 4 million tons of uranium ore and other harmful substances. Uranium production at the plant stopped in 1990. The technical equipment of the plant for processing uranium ore was dismantled and taken away to Russia. Today the factory is one of the biggest rare metal and rare earth metal producers in Europe.

The period between 1993 and 1997 was the most difficult time in Sillamäe's transformation. In 1992-1993 about 1,200 of its residents moved to Russia.[40] In subsequent years, the city's population declined more gradually without big waves of migration (see Table 3). The migration ratio in Sillamäe followed the general trend of the de-popularization of industrial cities all over Estonia. In 1993, there were 6,000 retirees, 4,500 children and 1,500 disabled people.[41] In the early 1990s, there was a rapid increase of crime in Sillamäe, probably due to high unemployment and its close proximity to Narva (Estonia's 'crime capital' in the 1990s). This was in stark contrast to the crime-free Soviet era. In 1993 there were 840 registered crimes and in 1995 there were 664 criminal acts.[42]

[38] Statistical data obtained in Sillamäe city hall, January 2009.

[39] ЦУКЕРМАН, Александр. Зона или открытый город? *День за днем*. 6 сентября 1996.

[40] Interview with T. Kalberg, Deputy Mayor of Sillamäe. November 2008.

[41] ТОЛМАЧЕВА, Л. Пятое заседание городского собрания. *Силламяэский вестник*. №2 (633) от 6 января 1993.

[42] СТАРКОВ, А. Ликвидировать преступность префект не обещает, но взять под контроль считает возможным. *Силламяэский вестник*. №8 (639) от 20 января 1994; Год минувший в зеркале уездной полицейской статистики. *Силламяэский вестник*. №11 (954) от 27 января 1996.

Table 4. Number of unemployed Sillamäe residents[43]

1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
2,000	1,173	1,270	1,149	948	970	709	373	433	488

Table 5. Number of workers at Sillamäe's factory[44]

1989	1994	1995	1996	1997	2008
5,000	1,700	1,630	1,500	1,500	550

In 1994, the unemployment rate reached 7%; in other words, every fourth family had one unemployed adult (see Tables 4 and 5). The first attempts to sell the factory started in 1994. The first four auctions were unsuccessful. During a six-year period (1991-1996), seven directors were replaced. Finally, in 1997, 65% of the factory was sold to AS Ephag, with the condition that the company would invest 540 million crowns into the port construction in Sillamäe. The factory was renamed Silmet and the former Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi became Director of the Board. By 1999, within just two years, the plant had become a profitable company under the new management. In 2000, exports rose to 410 million crowns with a profit of 35 million crowns.[45] Vahi lobbied at state level for the construction of a seaport and the creation of a free economic zone in Sillamäe due to its location close to Russian border. He was successful, and in November 1999, Sillamäe became a free economic zone, the first in Estonia. The concept of free economic zones had already been successfully implemented in Central Europe, for example, by Poland which had created a tax-free zone in the port of Gdansk in the mid 1980s. Thanks to Sillamäe's tax-free status, the Silmet plant was exempt from the 18% sales tax.

The Sillamäe port was commissioned in 2005, and was built with Russian and Estonian private capital. The port consists of two large areas: a terminal that processes petroleum products and a passenger terminal. The port was constructed after the environmental rehabilitation of a radioactive waste storage facility next to the site, near the Gulf of Finland, which was covered with an intermediate layer of special materials. This project was subsidized by the European Commission along with governments of other European countries and accounted for the long delay between the proclamation of the free economic zone and the construction of the port.

Twenty years after the transition, Sillamäe is still a Russian enclave in the territory of Estonia, which to some degree protects the city from big social conflicts. The population is stable; Estonians, most of whom work in the local authorities, account for just 4% of the population. The people are not neglected, employment opportunities have increased and there has been no real upheaval.

[43] Statistical data obtained in Sillamäe city hall, January 2009.

[44] Statistical data obtained in Silmet factory, November 2008.

[45] ИВАНОВ, В. Силламяэ – эстонский Сингапур. *Деловые ведомости*. 8 августа 2001.

Table 6. Population of Paldiski, 1990-2008[46]

	Total population	Estonian citizens	Estonians
1990	7,783	Closed city	
1991	7,603		
1992	7,586		
1993	7,543		
1994	7,507	60	60
1995	7,306	250	150
1996	6,785	674	450
1997	3,793	1,059	670
1998	3,842	1,274	726
2008	4,234	2,117	1,000

Case study 2: Paldiski

The construction of the city of Paldiski, which was a cantonment, began in the late 1940s.[47] The city had a base for nuclear submarines, a shipping dock, and a military hospital, and an educational training center with two nuclear reactors.[48] The educational training center was the largest naval training center for submarines in the USSR, training a total of 24,000 sailors.[49] The nuclear power reactors were closed down in 1990 for safety reasons; it was feared an accident similar to the one in Chernobyl might occur in Paldiski since both nuclear plants had the same design.[50]

One of the main characteristics of Paldiski as a closed city was its lack of a stabilized population. Being part of the military, the majority of the residents were only stationed in Paldiski for a few years. Consequently, the social infrastructure was poorly developed and the majority of the buildings were dormitories. This prevented the development of a city culture compared to Sillamäe. In 1994, Paldiski was the last remaining Russian cantonment in the newly established Baltic States. The reason for the delay in opening up the city was the long process it took to shut down the two nuclear reactors of the training center. All of the Russian military belongings, technical equipment and city archives were removed to Russia. About 36 military buildings were left in good condition but completely empty. These unprotected buildings fell into disrepair within few years.

[46] Statistical data obtained in Paldiski city hall, November 2008.

[47] МЕЛЬТЮХОВ, М. Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939-1941. Москва: Вече, 2000.
http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/05.html

[48] Miljan, Toivo. *Historical Dictionary of Estonia*. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2004, p. 361.

[49] Santana, Rebecca. Home on the abandoned military base. *The Baltic Times*. Oct 29- Nov 4, 1998.

[50] Rofer, C. (Ed.). *Turning a Problem into a Resource: Remidiation and Waste Management at the Sillamäe site, Estonia.* Tallinn: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1998, p.49.

In 1951, 3,500 people were living in Paldiski; in 1967 the population of the city increased to 8,000 people; at the beginning of 1980s there were 10,000 residents.[51] After the collapse of the Soviet Union a mere 7,000 people remained in Paldiski. In the mid-1990s the biggest part of the city population consisted of military veterans, youth, disabled people and divorced women.[52] These women divorced their husbands to avoid having to move to Russia.[53] Thus, Paldiski was full of incomplete families with an unproportional ratio of women to men. Since the majority of residents were children and retirees, the city lacked adults of working age. As a result, the government did not receive enough taxes to finance the development of the city.

During last 15 years there has been an influx of Estonians to Paldiski, due to the large number of empty and extremely cheap apartments after the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel and the city's proximity to the capital. The majority of the new residents of Paldiski were people on low incomes who were unable to pay their rent in Tallinn or other bigger cities. In many respects the city's development was influenced by the fact that during a 19-year period, from 1994 to 2009, Mayor Jaan Molder ruled Paldiski. The story of his arrival in Paldiski became a local legend, according to which he received a paper bag with the abbreviation USSR on it. Inside there were seven seals, and nothing else.

Jaan Molder's position in relation to the Russian-speaking population of the city was simple: 'If you want to stay here [in Paldiski], please learn the language, culture and customs of the Estonians'.[54] Given the fact that Paldiski had been a solely Russian city for 40 years, it was a tough position.

In the mid-1990s there were a few ideas for transforming the city, for example, to build a prison or a military training base. Finally, a training center for Estonian peacekeeping forces was opened in 1995. In 1997, the NATO 'Baltic Challenge' exercises and regional exercises 'Baltic Trial' were held with the participation of troops from Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Latvia and Lithuania. To some extent there is still continuity with the military past of the city.

The training center for Estonian peacekeeping forces does not provide jobs specifically for the residents of Paldiski. In 1995, in a city with a population of 7,000 people, only 300 people were employed.[55] In the winter of 1995, the heating and hot water was turned off due to the inability of Paldiski residents to pay their utility bills.[56] In the same year a local hospital and a public bath were closed. Until 1999, virtually the only operating company in the city was the port of Paldiski. The economic situation forced the inhabitants of Paldiski to work outside the city. That is why Paldiski rapidly became a

[51] МАЦЕЕВИЧ, Л. Об истории основания и развития города Палдиски. *Палдиски*. № 44/62 от 29 января 2010.
[52] ЛИТВИНОВА, Яна. Город в котором врут. *День за днем*. 11 июля 1997.
[53] MUISO, Merje. *Paldiskilinn Üldplaneering*. Paldiski : ENTEC AS, 2004, p. 13. http://www.paldiski.ee/failid/161_seletuskiri.pdf
[54] ИКОННИКОВ, В. Палдиски: «выживание» закончилось. *День за днем*. №37 (821) от 17 сентября 2004.
[55] ТОРШИНА, Л. Спасите город! *Молодежь Эстонии*. №27 от 8 июля 1995.
[56] ЛИБМАН, Элькольд. Есть город, которого нет. *Эстония*. №151 от 5 июля 1995.

'dormitory town', with about 25% of the total working population of Paldiski commuting to work outside the city.[57]

Because of the closed regime of Paldiski and surrounding area, the nature of the Pakri peninsula was untouched by urban influences and had potential for the development of tourism. However, Jaan Molder did not believe in developing the Pakri peninsula as a tourist destination. He decided to turn Paldiski into a naval transport hub instead, and to build an industrial park (a total of 24 production and business estates) on the 25-hectare territory. These ideas have been realized gradually. Today there are two independent ports in Paldiski, and the construction of the industrial park started in 2008. However, only one plot has been bought so far. The nuclear problem of the city has been solved provisionally. In 2007, the training center was placed into a sarcophagus for the next 50 years. The project cost 25 million crowns and was subsidized by the EU project PHARE.[58]

Conclusion

Paldiski and Sillamäe experienced a heavy transition period. The main difference in the economy of these cities was that Sillamäe was a town with producing capacities, and Paldiski was not. After several years of economic and social depression these two cities began to use their apparent advantage, namely their good geographical location. Paldiski now plans to become a transportation and industrial complex, while Sillamäe has already made great steps in this direction, becoming a significant logistics center in the region.

The relative success of Sillamäe during the transformation process was due to the activities of the Director of the Board of the Silmet plant Tiit Vahi. The former Prime Minister found the investments for the development of the port and of a free economic zone. Today, Sillamäe is still a single-industry town and a transportation center of the north-eastern part of Estonia, while modern Paldiski is a satellite of Tallinn with ambitions to become a transportation hub in the northern part of Estonia.

The heritage of their past as closed cities influenced the initial stage of the transformation of Paldiski and Sillamäe. At the beginning of transformation, lack of information and mutual mistrust between the residents of these former closed cities and the rest of Estonian society did not allow the full potential of Paldiski and Sillamäe to be exploited. Difficulties in obtaining Estonian citizenship in the 1990s and the restrictions on the rights of the Russian-speaking minority resulted in the fact that today in Sillamäe there are more Russian citizens than Estonians. However, it is important to note the gradual relaxation in Estonian relations with the Russian minority, seen in the softening of language requirements for obtaining Estonian citizenship and in the small inward migration to Paldiski by Estonians.

The impact of Paldiski's and Sillamäe's past as closed cities has become less noticeable over the years. Since the coming into being of modern Estonia, a new generation of residents has grown up in these cities which has no experience of life in a

[57] ЮРМАНН, Виктория. Половина Эстонии – таллиннский регион. *Молодежь Эстонии*. 20 февраля 2007. http://www.moles.ee/07/Feb/20/5-1.php

[58] ПОЛИЕНКО, Ольга. В Палдиски откроется новое хранилище радиоактивных отходов. *ERR Novosti*. 11 октября 2007. http://novosti.err.ee/index.php?2591695

closed city and which has had the opportunity to learn Estonian at local schools. If Estonian society provided more opportunities for social mobility in Paldiski and Sillamäe, the level of social and economic integration would increase even more.

Appendix 1

Valid residence permits by citizenship holders in Estonia.

	Alien's passport	Russian citizens	Citizens of other states (except Estonia)	Total
2003	164,730	88,207	13,538	266,475
2004	162,075	88,130	12,352	262,557
2005	150,536	91,424	13,164	255,124
2006	136,000	93,027	14,769	243,796
2007	125,799	95,658	8,143	229,600
2008	116,217	95,841	8,779	220,837
2009	110,284	96,616	9,445	216,345

Source: Полищук, В. *Ежегодный доклад 2008 – Эстония*. Таллинн : Центр по правам человека, 2009. http://www.lichr.ee/main/assets/god2008.pdf

Appendix 2

Levels of unemployment and the economically active population in Estonia (%).

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Estonians %													
Economically active population	64.6	63.8	62.4	62.5	62.5	62.1	62.8	62.5	62	65.4	65.5	66.3	65.2
Unemployment	7.8	7.9	9.8	11.1	10.4	7.9	7.3	6.4	5.3	4	3.6	4.2	11
Non-Estonians %													
Economically active population	64.9	64.4	64.2	64.8	64.2	62.8	63.4	63.7	64.7	65.5	66.1	67.4	69.2
Unemployment	13.2	13.6	16.5	18	16.8	14.9	15.2	15.6	12.9	9.7	6.9	8.2	19

Source: Department of Statistics in Estonia; www.pub.stat.ee.